A Primer on North Carolina and Federal Use of Force Law: Trends in Fourth Amendment Doctrine, Qualified Immunity, and State Law Issues by McGuinness, J. Michael
Campbell Law Review
Volume 31
Issue 3 Spring 2009 Article 3
January 2009
A Primer on North Carolina and Federal Use of
Force Law: Trends in Fourth Amendment
Doctrine, Qualified Immunity, and State Law Issues
J. Michael McGuinness
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Campbell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law.
Recommended Citation
J. Michael McGuinness, A Primer on North Carolina and Federal Use of Force Law: Trends in Fourth Amendment Doctrine, Qualified
Immunity, and State Law Issues, 31 Campbell L. Rev. 431 (2009).
A Primer on North Carolina and
Federal Use of Force Law:
Trends in Fourth Amendment Doctrine, Qualified
Immunity, and State Law Issues*
J. MICHAEL McGUINNESSt
The Constitution simply does not require police to gamble with their lives
in the face of a serious threat of harm. 1
An officer of the law has the right to use such force as he may reasonably
believe necessary in the proper discharge of his duties to effect an
arrest. . . . [T]he officer is properly left with the discretion to determine
the amount of force required under the circumstances as they appear to
him at the time of the arrest.2
[W]e must avoid substituting our personal notions of proper police proce-
dure for the instantaneous decision of the officer at the scene. We must
never allow the theoretical, sanitized world of our imagination to replace
the dangerous and complex world that policemen face every day. What
constitutes "reasonable" action may seem quite different to someone facing
a possible assailant than to someone analyzing the question at leisure.3
INTRODUCTION
Police use of force is a critically important component of effective
criminal justice in North Carolina and throughout America. Using
force to accomplish the primary objectives of criminal justice is one of
* This Article constitutes a revised, updated, and expanded version of a previous
article published in Volume 24 of the Campbell Law Review. See J. Michael
McGuinness, Law Enforcement Use of Force: The Objective Reasonableness Standards
Under North Carolina and Federal Law, 24 CAMPBELL L. REV. 201 (2002).
t B.A., cum laude, University of North Carolina; J.D., North Carolina Central
University; post-graduate study, National Law Center, George Washington University.
Mr. McGuinness practices law enforcement liability and civil rights litigation from his
offices in Elizabethtown, North Carolina and Washington, D.C. Mr. McGuinness has
served as counsel in numerous use of force and other law enforcement cases. You may
contact Mr. McGuinness at jmichael@mcguinnesslaw.com or at 910-862-7087.
This Article is dedicated to the 417 North Carolina law enforcement officers that
have been killed in the line of duty.
1. Elliot v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640, 641 (4th Cir. 1996).
2. State v. Anderson, 253 S.E.2d 48, 50 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979). See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-401(d)(1) (2007).
3. Smith v. Freeland, 954 F.2d 343, 347 (6th Cir. 1992).
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many appropriate tools of the law enforcement profession. Violence
from suspects and others has increased as the disrespect for police
officers has grown in recent years. Life for officers on the beat has
never been more dangerous. 4
The use of police force often generates litigation against law
enforcement officers. However, courts throughout America, including
the United States Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
and North Carolina courts, have recently responded with enhanced
legal protection to insulate police officers from constitutional and tort
liability.5 The central issue in most use of force litigation is typically
whether an objectively reasonable officer could have reasonably believed
that the force employed was appropriate under the circumstances.6 Thus,
4. See Nat'l Law Enforcement Officers Mem'l Fund, Law Enforcement Facts,
http://www.nleomf.com/TheMemorial/Facts/polfacts.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2009)
[hereinafter Law Enforcement Facts]. The National Law Enforcement Officers
Memorial Fund's website contains extensive data regarding the history of danger to the
American law enforcement profession. For example, on average, there are 167 officers
per year killed in the line of duty. Id. On average, there are more than 56,000 assaults
on officers per year, resulting in more than 16,000 injuries per year. Id. Being shot is
the most prevalent source of death. Id. There have been 18,274 officers killed in the
line of duty in America. Id. America has over 900,000 sworn law enforcement
officers. Id. An estimated 5.2 million "violent crimes" occurred in the United States
in 2005. Id. North Carolina has lost 417 officers to death in the line of duty. Nat'l
Law Enforcement Officers Mem'l Fund, State and Federal Breakdown of Law Officer's
Deaths, http://www.nleomf.com/TheMemorial/Facts/state.htm (last visited Mar. 30,
2009). Many developments and studies demonstrate growing risks for police officers.
See, e.g., Kris Mohandie et al., Suicide by Cops Among Officer-Involved Shooting Cases,
54 J. FORENSIC Sci. 456 (2009).
See N.C. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN NORTH CAROLINA-2007: ANNUAL SUMMARY
REPORT OF 2007 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING DATA (2008), available at http://sbi2.jus.
state.nc.us/crp/public/2007/ASR/2007%2oAnnual%2oSummary%20.pdf (stating
that "the murder rate increased 8.5%" in 2007 over 2006); Dep't of Justice, Law
Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/2007/ (last
visited Mar. 7, 2009) (confirming the continuing violence perpetrated against police
officers-including assaults and murders); State Bureau of Investigation, Officers
Assaulted by Situation and Weapon, http://sbi2.jus.state.nc.us/crp/public/2O07/LEO
KillAsslt/LEOAssltSitWeaO7/LEOAssltSitWeaO7/leoassltsitwea04/leoassltsitwea04.
htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2009) (noting that, in 2007, there were 2567 assaults on
officers.).
5. See, e.g., Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 782 (2009) ("[T]he government's
'legitimate and weighty' interest in officer safety outweighs the 'de minimis' additional
intrusion [of a Terry frisk.]"). See the cases collected in notes 48 and 83-91.
6. A trilogy of decisions provide the parameters for the typical use of force case.
See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 210 (2001), modified by Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S.
Ct. 808 (2009); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989); Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985); see also Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997)
(reviewing governmental liability issues).
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the "first step is for the Court to determine whether the [d]efendant['s]
'actions were objectively reasonable."' 7 This fundamental standard
has generated scores of state and federal cases in a variety of use of
force contexts.8
This Article analyzes recent trends and updates the status of use
of force law under North Carolina and federal standards. 9 Use of force
law has significantly changed in recent years, whereby most courts
have further insulated officers from liability. The United States
Supreme Court has recently issued major use of force decisions in
Scott v. Harris'° and Brosseau v. Haugen." Furthermore, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit continues to be very
active in producing leading use of force and qualified immunity deci-
sions.12 Thus, this Article focuses its analysis on Fourth Amendment
use of force methodology in leading United States Supreme Court,
Fourth Circuit, and North Carolina cases. Statutory and common law
use of force standards under North Carolina law, including self-
defense and apparent dangers, are also examined. Additionally, the
prevailing liability standards employed in determining whether use of
force is excessive, particularly in "mistaken belief' and vehicular cases,
are explored. Finally, the nature of expert testimony is reviewed since
those cases have similarly evolved with new standards.
13
7. Marvin v. City of Taylor, 509 F.3d 234, 245 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)).
8. See, e.g., Elliot v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640, 641 (4th Cir. 1996) ("The Constitution
simply does not require police to gamble with their lives in the face of a serious threat
of harm.").
9. Since 2002, use of force law has substantially evolved, recognizing the
increasingly dangerous world that police officers face every day. Both substantive use
of force law determining whether a Fourth Amendment claim is presented and the
doctrine of qualified immunity have further heightened the threshold for establishing
an actionable case sufficient to survive summary judgment. The "could have believed"
standard is now more rigorously enforced, especially by the Fourth Circuit. See J.
Michael McGuinness, Law Enforcement Use of Force: The Objective Reasonableness
Standards Under North Carolina and Federal Law, 24 CAMPBELL. L. REV. 201 (2002). Cf.
UREY W. PATRICK & JOHN C. HALL, IN DEFENSE OF SELF & OTHERS: ISSUES, FACTS AND
FALLACIES-THE REALITIES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT'S USE OF DEADLY FORCE (2005)
(offering one of the first comprehensive practical analyses of use of force by providing
extensive insight into a better understanding of the need for and scope of police deadly
force).
10. 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
11. 543 U.S. 194 (2004). Both Scott and Brosseau are vehicular use of force cases.
12. See sources cited infra note 48.
13. The area of expert testimony is another area where courts have tightened
admissibility standards to curtail the ability of plaintiffs to offer loose opinions of
what they think is right or wrong. See Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 364 (2d Cir.
43320091
3
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I. THE UNDERLYING POLICE ENVIRONMENT AND USE OF FORCE LIABILITY
The core mission of American policing requires law enforcement
officers to physically encounter a broad range of suspects in the course
of their ordinary duties. The daily work of police officers serving in
patrol and related functions puts officers on the front line, often
requiring instantaneous responses to all types of unpredictable human
behaviors. The history of American policing demonstrates that a sig-
nificant portion of individuals encountered by police officers engage
in conduct that places the officer, bystanders, and other members of
the public in danger.
The routine work of officers often puts them in harm's way, which
frequently requires officers to use force to perform their duties and
survive. Felony suspects appear to be the more likely to overreact to an
officer's inquiry by direct attack, flight, or both. However, misdemean-
ants also respond with violence. Suspects create varying "fight or
flight" scenarios which require officers to employ physical force to
apprehend suspects and stop the threats to themselves and the public.
Stopping the threat of violence is typically the foremost objective of the
use of force. Both actual and apparent threats must be thwarted by
reasonable force.
Typical police encounters often pit officers against dangerous sus-
pects at traffic stops, domestic calls, and many other routine police
operations. Police encounters often become confrontational and the
physical risks to officers during such encounters can present deadly
threats. Police officers are regularly confronted with some of the most
deadly weapons, including: automobiles, shotguns, rifles, pistols,
knives, fireplace pokers, farm equipment, axes, self-made bombs,
chemicals, and other devices. Being spit upon was traditionally consid-
ered a minimum risk; recently, however, it was recognized as being
potentially deadly for officers.' 4
Law enforcement involves protecting citizens from harm, investi-
gating alleged or suspected crimes, apprehending and taking suspects
1992). The "could have believed" test is one for judicial determination on a motion for
summary judgment. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227-28 (1991). Expert
testimony was becoming a means for plaintiffs to get around the Supreme Court
principle of avoiding hindsight in force analysis. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
396 (1989) ("The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of
hindsight." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Zuchel v. City of Denver, 997 F.2d
730, 742-43 (10th Cir. 1993). However, more recent cases have limited expert
testimony especially in individual liability claims. See Hygh, 961 F.2d at 364.
14. See State v. Price, 834 N.E.2d 847, 850 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
434 [Vol. 31:431
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into custody, interviewing suspects, and countless other challenging
duties. Law enforcement officers are required to respond to citizen
requests for assistance.' 5 As a recent North Carolina Supreme Court
decision stated, "[plolice officers have a duty to apprehend lawbreak-
ers."16 The foremost mission of an investigating law enforcement
officer is to protect all citizens from harm and to apprehend criminal
suspects. For instance, "police must pursue crime and constrain vio-
lence, even if the undertaking itself causes violence from time to
time.' 1 7 As Judge Fox has eloquently explained:
It is the duty of a law enforcement officer... to stand his ground,
carry through on the performance of his duties, and meet force with
force, so long as he acts in good faith and uses no more force than
reasonably appears ... necessary to effectuate his duties and save him-
self from harm.'
8
The streets of North Carolina and America are becoming increas-
ingly full of criminals wielding sophisticated illegal weaponry, bullet
proof vests, and special ammunition designed to kill officers on the
front line.' 9 In fact, our streets are so full of illegal guns that they have
been described as a "domestic Vietnam. ' 20 In many situations, law
enforcement officers are the primary targets of these illegal guns.
Additionally, suspects and criminals, in recent years, have frequently
used their vehicles as weapons against police officers. 2 ' Therefore, the
use of vehicles as weapons at traffic stops, and in flight from apprehen-
sion, is a legitimate threat to police officers. 22 As a result, "[a] police
15. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-230 (2007). Failure to properly act can result in
malfeasance in office and other charges against law enforcement officers. Id.
16. Parish v. Hill, 513 S.E.2d 547, 550 (N.C. 1999) (citing Mixon v. City of Warner
Robins, 434 S.E.2d 71, 73 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 444 S.E.2d 761
(Ga. 1994)).
17. Menuel v. City of Atlanta, 25 F.3d 990, 997 (11th Cir. 1994).
18. Morrison v. Martin, 755 F. Supp. 683, 692 (E.D.N.C. 1990) (citing State v.
Ellis, 86 S.E.2d 272, 274 (N.C. 1955)).
19. See KENNETH J. PEAK, POLICING AMERICA: METHODS, ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 357-
58 (5th ed. 1993).
20. See Gordon Witkin et al., Cops Under Fire, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 3,
1990, at 32-44.
21. National statistics demonstrate how many police officers are killed by suspects
wielding vehicles as weapons. One hundred and fifty-four officers were killed from
being struck by a vehicle out of the 1640 officers killed from 1999 through 2008. Nat'l
Law Enforcement Officers Mem'l Fund, Causes of Law Enforcement Death, http://
www.nleomf.com/TheMemorial/Facts/causes.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2009).
22. See id.
5
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officer's life is always at risk, no matter how routine the assignment
might seem. '"23
Law enforcement use of force is among the most controversial
public interest topics throughout the country.2 4 Hardly a day passes
without an incident sparking a cry of alleged "police brutality."'2 5
However, many use of force judgment calls are incredibly difficult for a
police officer to make because of a myriad of physical and environ-
mental constraints and limitations. The United States Supreme Court
has observed that there is often a "hazy border between excessive and
acceptable force."26 As such, use of force law is very misunderstood.2 7
Federal and North Carolina courts have addressed a broad variety
of cases presenting police force issues.28 Many of the headline grab-
bing cases invoke strong emotion, often pitting interest groups against
officers even when there is no evidence of improper motivations.29
Most police shootings, or other instances of significant use of force,
prompt media commentary that is usually predicated upon specula-
23. N.C. POLICE BENEVOLENT ASS'N, THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER DISCIPLINE ACT
(HOUSE BILL 980/SENATE BILL 980): A CRITICAL NECESSITY FOR THE PROMOTION OF PUBLIC
SAFETY IN NORTH CAROLINA 2 n.2, available at http://www.ncpba.org/legislative/
stories/THE_LAWENFORCEMENT_OFFICERDISCIPLINEACT/discipline2.pdf
(last visited Mar. 7, 2009) (citations omitted).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2002) (reversing
convictions in the Louima case); United States v. Volpe, 224 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2000);
People v. Boss, 701 N.Y.S.2d 342 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (known as the Amadou Diallo
case); see also Jane Fritsch, The Diallo Verdict: The Overview; Four Officers in Diallo
Shooting Are Acquitted of All Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2000; U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Addressing Police Conduct, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/polmis.php
(last visited Apr. 3, 2009).
25. See Scott D. Maclatchie, Defending Police Shootings Against Trigger-Happy
Lawsuits, 30 BRIEF 69 (2001), available at http://www.wcsr.com/resources/pdfs/
maclatchiepolice.pdf.
26. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 210 (2001), modified by Pearson v. Callahan, 129
S. Ct. 808 (2009) (citations omitted).
27. See Geoffrey P. Alpert & William C. Smith, How Reasonable Is the Reasonable
Man?: Police and Excessive Force, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 481 (1994).
28. Force issues arise in both civil and criminal litigation. Force issues often arise
in detention, arrest, suspect transportation, pre-trial confinement, and other contexts.
See, e.g., Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005); Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362 (4th
Cir. 2002); Caldwell v. Moore, 968 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1992); Baribeau v. City of
Minneapolis, 578 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (D. Minn. 2008).
29. See Brown, 278 F.3d at 370. The terms "police brutality" and "excessive force"
have become such common parlance in the new millennium that suspects being
arrested often begin to launch verbal threats of litigation before and during the
encounter.
436 [Vol. 31:431
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tion and emotion.3 ° Moreover, the media regularly fuels accusations
based upon substantially incomplete information.3 1 It usually takes
weeks or months before all witnesses can be interviewed and all evi-
dence analyzed. However, the media often has officers convicted in the
court of public opinion in the direct aftermath of the incident. High-
profile police use of force cases in North Carolina have focused con-
cern on the underlying legal standards.
32
The most common form of alleged police misconduct is excessive
force.3 3 Alleged excessive force may arise where handcuffs are too
tight; hands-on force is used in suspect processing and transportation;
less-than-lethal devices are used, such as Tasers,3 4 pepper spray, and
30. See Maclatchie, supra note 25 ("The journalistic spin on the story often
questions the wisdom of the decision of the police to use deadly force, and readily
offers the editorial opinions of outsiders armed with Monday-morning-quarterback
luxury of detached analysis.").
31. Media commentary of police shootings is a major source impeding proper
objective review of police conduct as well as unduly inflaming tensions in the local
community. Typically, the media will show up at incident scenes trying to quickly get
the "scoop" and frame an inflammatory headline. Police officers are typically
forbidden from publicly commenting about their official police actions. Thus, officers
are immediately handicapped in the media environment. However, purported
witnesses who may have been present or not present often offer their own conclusory
opinions. A serious injury often invokes tears and strong emotion, which the media
often views as a ripe environment for a hot story. Meanwhile, the officer typically
becomes the target for what usually becomes a series of media articles with
conclusions long before the witnesses are properly interviewed, the scene is
scientifically analyzed, or objective overall analysis is performed. Countless examples
of misleading and false media assertions surround police shootings. See, e.g., Myron
Pitts, Perception, Law May Conflict in Shooting, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER, Dec. 21, 2008,
at 1B ("This looks bad. The news will further inflame some people in the community
.... This troubling incident may be one of those cases where what is legally justified
conflicts with public perception.... We can speculate all day but none of us knows.").
32. One United States Supreme Court case on use of force arose from North
Carolina. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). In North Carolina, even
investigations into alleged excessive force have generated high profile litigation. See In
re Brooks, 548 S.E.2d 748 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (involving an unprecedented ex parte
procedure that was used by the State Bureau of Investigation, but ultimately declared
improper, to obtain confidential personnel and internal affairs files of officers without
a warrant and without notice to the officers and opportunity to be heard).
33. See, e.g., ALEXIS ARTWOHL & LOREN W. CHRISTENSEN, DEADLY FORCE ENCOUNTERS
(1997); THOMAS GILLESPIE ET AL., POLICE USE OF FORCE (1998).
34. Tasers have resulted in a number of use of force cases. See, e.g., Draper v.
Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2004); Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492
(6th Cir. 2002); Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1993); Johnson v.
City of Lincoln Park, 434 F. Supp. 2d 467 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Nicholson v. Kent
County Sheriff's Dep't, 839 F. Supp. 508 (W.D. Mich. 1993). These electronic control
7
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asp batons; police canines are used;35 or where other types of deadly
police weapons are used.
In a split second, officers are required to evaluate the situation
and employ force against criminal suspects to thwart apparent dangers
to citizens and themselves. 36  The officer is often alone in this
nightmare, like a "pedestrian in Hell."' 37 It should not be surprising
then that the most common source of death for officers is murder com-
mitted by criminal suspects in the process of their arrest.38 The
officer's environment in use of force decision-making is particularly
unique due to the stress and time pressures to act immediately without
"armchair reflection" and because the lives of officers and bystanders
are often at risk.39 This split-second decision-making environment
often necessitates the exercise of judgment under severe environmental
constraints, such as darkness and other limitations on vision, noise
(including the sounds of gunshots), weather, and other environmental
factors that enhance the difficulty of assessing the particular scene and
circumstances. Police conduct undertaken in a second or two is often
replayed by pundits with speculation for years thereafter.
In most serious police operations with rapidly-evolving develop-
ments, occasional mistakes will inevitably be made. These mistakes
result from suspect behavior, environmental conditions, and all sorts
of other causes. Officers must often quickly form beliefs regarding the
totality of circumstances that they are confronting. Generally, if an
devices appear to have substantial utility in controlling force and avoiding more likely
deadly force to follow. See Draper, 369 F.3d at 1278.
35. The use of police dogs has generated numerous cases. See, e.g., Priester v. City
of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919 (11th Cir. 2000); Vathekan v. Prince George's County,
154 F.3d 173 (4th Cir. 1998).
36. See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 210 (2001), modified by Pearson v.
Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009); Park v. Shiflett, 250 F.3d 843, 853 (4th Cir. 2001);
Anderson v. Russell, 247 F.3d 125, 129 (4th Cir. 2001); McLenagan v. Karnes, 27 F.3d
1002, 1006-07 (4th Cir. 1994); Ford v. Childers, 855 F.2d 1271, 1276 (7th Cir. 1988)
("[An officer oftentimes has only a split second to make the critical judgment of
whether to use his weapon.").
37. WILLIAM A. WESTLEY, VIOLENCE AND THE POLICE (1970) ("The policeman's world
is spawned of degradation, corruption and insecurity . . .[H]e walks alone, like a
pedestrian in Hell."); Law Enforcement Facts, supra note 4 (revealing "an average of
one death every 53 hours" over the previous ten years for police officers in the line of
duty).
38. See PEAK, supra note 19, at 359.
39. Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1996) ("[Olfficers on the beat are
not often afforded the luxury of armchair reflection."). See Seth D. DuCharme, The
Search for Reasonableness in Use-Of-Force Cases: Understanding the Effects of Stress on
Perception and Performance, 70 FORDHAm L. REv. 2515 (2002).
[Vol. 31:431
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officer's mistaken belief is objectively reasonable under the circum-
stances, then the officer is not subject to liability.4" This is true under
both North Carolina and federal law. 4 Moreover, the perceived dan-
ger must only be apparent, not actual, in order to justify the use of
deadly force.42
Applying overlapping applicable doctrines is sometimes not so
simple. Professor John Rubin of the Institute of Government at the
University of North Carolina has observed that "despite its place in
North Carolina jurisprudence, . . . the excessive force element has been
difficult to apply. The principal difficulty has been with distinguish-
ing the requirement that the Defendant's force not be excessive, or
unreasonable, from the reasonable belief requirement embodied" in
the law.43
Recent cases have clarified many use of force issues. In Saucier v.
Katz, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed that the doctrine of
mistaken beliefs is applicable in use of force cases. 44 In Brosseau v.
Haugen, the Court held that an officer, who shot a suspect that was
fleeing by vehicle, was entitled to qualified immunity where the officer
believed that the suspect, in flight, posed a danger to other officers and
the public.45 Additionally, Scott v. Harris is the Supreme Court's most
recent venture into alleged excessive force. 46 In Scott, the Court reaf-
firmed the core use of force doctrine and applied it to insulate officers
from liability in the context of a pursuit involving the use of intentional
force to stop a fleeing suspect by ramming his vehicle from behind.4 7
North Carolina and federal law have recently evolved to better
insulate officers from liability in general, and especially in cases where
there are not bright line rules that can be applied. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has emerged as perhaps the
leading circuit court in curtailing alleged excessive force litigation by
frequent summary judgment dispositions that are often premised
upon qualified immunity for the officer.48 It is clear that use of force
cases are especially ripe for qualified immunity.
40. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 387 (1989).
41. See id. at 396; Perry v. Gibson, 100 S.E.2d 341, 342 (N.C. 1957).
42. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985).
43. JOHN RUBIN, THE LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE IN NORTH CAROLINA 75 (1996).
44. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 210 (2001), modified by Pearson v. Callahan, 129
S. Ct. 808 (2009). See Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 370 (4th Cir. 2002).
45. 543 U.S. 194 (2004).
46. 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
47. Id.
48. The Fourth Circuit is a leader in qualified immunity cases, and these cases
have granted qualified immunity to officers and reaffirmed the deferential standards
439
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A number of factors have contributed to the environment that
necessitates police use of force in response to apparent dangers. One
of these factors is the increasing population of armed suspects. Drug
dealers are often armed with the most sophisticated, high-tech weap-
ons including Uzi-style assault weaponry.4 9 Civil rights advocates
have challenged police for the failure to protect citizens from these bet-
ter-armed criminals. This phenomenon has been particularly preva-
lent in the alleged domestic violence context.5 0 Law-abiding citizens
rightfully demand instantaneous and decisive law enforcement
responses to their legitimate needs. Citizens are quick to complain
when criminal offenders are not apprehended. Courts have generally
recognized that law enforcement officers are vulnerable to unfounded
claims of abuse.51
Like most jurisdictions, North Carolina courts have become a
common forum for various types of alleged excessive force cases
against law enforcement officers.5 2 North Carolina has even begun to
applicable to officers. See, e.g., Abney v. Coe, 493 F.3d 412, 415 (4th Cir. 2007) ("The
requirement of reasonableness . . . accords police officers latitude .... " (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Alford v. Cumberland County, No. 06-1569, 2007 WL
2985297 (4th Cir. Oct. 15, 2007); Carr v. Deeds, 453 F.3d 593, 600 (4th Cir. 2006);
Waterman v. Batton, 393 F.3d 471 (4th Cir. 2005); Wilson v. Flynn, 429 F.3d 465
(4th Cir. 2005); Altman v. City of High Point, 330 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2003); Brown v.
Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 365 (4th Cir. 2002) (granting qualified immunity for an
officer where the plaintiff refused to obey the officer's command); Gomez v. Atkins,
296 F.3d 253, 266 (4th Cir. 2002) (Hamilton, J., concurring); Milstead v. Kibler, 243
F.3d 157, 165 (4th Cir. 2001) (concluding deadly force was objectively reasonable
where the officer mistakenly believed a fleeing person was threatening other officers);
Anderson v. Russell, 247 F.3d 125, 130 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting split-second decision-
making principles require the court to accept what the officer "perceived immediately
before" using force); Cox v. County of Prince William, 249 F.3d 295, 300 (4th Cir.
2001) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation); Sigman v. Town of Chapel Hill, 161
F.3d 782, 788 (4th Cir. 1998) (involving reasonable perception of a weapon); Pittman
v. Nelms, 87 F.3d 116, 120 (4th Cir. 1996); Edmundson v. Keesler, Nos. 95-3125, 95-
3132, 1996 WL 683888 (4th Cir. Nov. 27, 1996); Elliot v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640, 641
(4th Cir. 1996).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Kirk, 105 F.3d 997 (5th Cir. 1997).
50. Application of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) through case law has developed
liability theories against law enforcement officers and agencies for failing to properly
respond to domestic violence. See Watson v. City of Kan. City, 857 F.2d 690 (10th
Cir. 1988).
51. See, e.g., Brooks v. Scheib, 813 F.2d 1191, 1194 (11th Cir. 1987) (noting that
officers working in high crime areas are subject to a higher numbers of complaints).
52. See, e.g., State v. Hicks, No. 98 CRS 10492 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 3, 1998). In
State v. Hicks, the Honorable Jack Thompson, Superior Court Judge, issued an order
dismissing an alleged voluntary manslaughter charge against Hoke County Deputy
Hicks at the close of the State's evidence. There, the criminal suspect led Deputy
440 [Vol. 31:431
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indict officers for allegations of excessive force with greater fre-
quency. 3 Although "[t]he amount of deadly force since the early
1970's has dropped fifty percent in the major cities, '54 alleged exces-
sive force cases against law enforcement officers continue to explode. 5
Alleged police misconduct claims encompass a wide variety of poten-
tial tort-related claims.56 Law enforcement officers may be subject to
Hicks on a high speed chase and temporarily lost Deputy Hicks. Later, Deputy Hicks
found the suspect near his van, whereby the suspect jumped in his van and attempted
to drive off. Deputy Hicks observed the suspect reach down to the floor of the van as if
he was retrieving a gun. The suspect was driving the van towards Deputy Hicks and
four citizens. Deputy Hicks, consequently, shot at the suspect eleven times, striking
and killing him. There was no weapon in the suspect's van. However, the suspect's
gesture implied such a weapon. Judge Thompson's announced decision appeared to
rely heavily upon chapter 15A, section 401 of the North Carolina General Statutes. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-401 (2007).
53. See Mark Nichols, Pursuit Leads To Felony Indictment, AM. POLICE BEAT, Mar.
2002. In North Carolina, officers have been subjected to unlawful investigative tactics,
including warrantless seizures of confidential records in attempts to indict officers.
See In re Brooks, 548 S.E.2d 748 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000). The North Carolina criminal
cases against officers for use of force have largely failed. North Carolina tried twice to
indict Deputy Christopher Long for murder in connection with a shooting incident
arising from a S.W.A.T. raid. In both instances, the grand jury failed to return a true
bill of indictment. See No Indictment in PlayStation Shooting, REDORBIT, July, 11, 2007,
http://www.redorbit.com/news/scifi-gaming/996767/no_indictmentin-playstation_
shooting/index.html. Many other North Carolina grand juries have declined to indict
officers in use-of-force contexts. This trend appears consistent with the extraordinarily
high criminal law standards under chapter 15A, section 401 of the North Carolina
General Statutes and case law. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-401 (2007).
54. Paul G. Chevigny, Police Violence: Causes and Cures, 7 J.L. & POL'Y 85, 89
(1998).
55. See KENNETH ADAMS ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, USE OF FORCE By POLICE
(1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/176330-1.pdf; MICHAEL AVERY
ET AL., POLICE MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LITIGATION § 2:19 (3d ed. 1999). See generally
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Citizen Complaints About Police Use of Force, http://www.
ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ccpuf.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2009) (providing statistics
on use of force complaints). The explosion of frivolous claims against police officers
appears predicated upon a number of factors. The framing of a facially valid claim
under bare notice pleading standards is quite easy. However, the overwhelming
majority of excessive force claims do not survive summary judgment for a wide variety
of deficiencies. See, e.g., Sigman v. Town of Chapel Hill, 161 F.3d 782 (4th Cir. 1998).
56. The broad range of prospective civil and civil rights claims against police
officers include: negligence claims; claims based on arrest and detention involving
warrantless arrests; arrests under unconstitutional statutes and ordinances; malicious
prosecution; abuse of process; retaliatory prosecution; illegal searches and seizures;
deprivations through improper use of informants and undercover agents; deprivation
of First Amendment rights based on retaliatory actions; illegal interrogations; denial of
medical attention; denial of counsel; defamation; verbal abuse and harassment; failure
to provide police protection in various contexts, including domestic violence;
11
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civil actions,57 civil rights actions,5" and criminal liability actions 59 for
conspiracies to violate civil rights; interference with family relationships; police
pursuits; failure to disclose or act upon exculpatory evidence; negligence or deliberate
indifference in the establishment or maintenance of road blocks; misuse of weapons;
invasion of privacy; discrimination; and otherwise. See AVERY ET AL., supra note 55.
The everyday vehicle stop now invokes cutting-edge theories of ethnic profiling
premised upon statistical analysis. See Sean P. Trende, Note, Why Modest Proposals
Offer the Best Solution for Combating Racial Profiling, 50 DuKE L.J. 331 (2000).
57. Common law torts for assault and battery apply to law enforcement use of
force. A battery consists of intentional infliction of harmful or offensive contact upon
the claimant's person without the claimant's consent. See Burwell v. Giant Genie
Corp., 446 S.E.2d 126, 128 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (grabbing the plaintiffs arm held
sufficient); Wilson v. Bellamy, 414 S.E.2d 347, 357-58 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992). However,
North Carolina police officers are public officials and are therefore subject to the
doctrine of public official immunity, which immunizes them from common law tort
claims where the action is not corrupt, malicious, or beyond the scope of their
authority. See, e.g., Smith v. Hefner, 68 S.E.2d 783, 787 (N.C. 1952); Barnett v.
Karpinos, 460 S.E.2d 208, 213 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995); Hare v. Butler, 394 S.E.2d 231,
236 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990); Wiggins v. City of Monroe, 326 S.E.2d 39, 43 (N.C. Ct. App.
1985); Pigott v. City of Wilmington, 273 S.E.2d 752, 753-54 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981).
58. Among the most common civil rights actions for alleged excessive force are
Fourth Amendment claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). See, e.g., Graham
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 386 (1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 1 (1985); Spell
v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1383 (4th Cir. 1987).
59. Homicide and felonious assault charges under North Carolina law may apply
to law enforcement use of force allegations. However, those substantive laws must also
be applied together with the statutory use of force standard in chapter 15A, section
401 of the North Carolina General Statutes. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-401 (2007).
Despite the availability of potential criminal charges, prosecutions of North Carolina
officers are very rare because of the stringent standards in section 401 and case law.
See id.
Federal statutes also preclude excessive force. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 241
(2000) generally prohibits conspiracies to violate civil rights, and 18 U.S.C. § 242
generally prohibits excessive force and other conduct that deprives one of a federal
constitutional or statutory right. Specifically, § 242 "imposes a criminal penalty on
anyone who, under color of state law, willfully subjects any person to the deprivation
of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Id. See United
States v. Colbert, 172 F.3d 594, 596 (8th Cir. 1999). The most recent interpretation of
§ 242 by the United States Supreme Court appears in United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S.
259 (1997). In Lanier, a Tennessee state judge was convicted for violating § 242 for
having sexually assaulted judicial employees and litigants. Id. at 259. The Court held
that § 242 makes it "criminal to act (1) willfully and (2) under color of law (3) to
deprive a person of rights protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States."
Id. at 264 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, excessive force is actionable
under § 242 when the stringent statutory standards can be met. See, e.g., United
States v. Dean, 722 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1983) (concluding that "excessive force can
be the basis of a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 242"). Many other recent cases have
confirmed the reach and breadth of § 242. See United States v. Daniels, 281 F.3d 168
(5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Tines, 70 F.3d 891 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v.
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excessive force. However, a single legal standard applies to all of these
alleged excessive force charges: the objective reasonableness standard.60
II. OUTLINE OF FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE IN THE
ANALYSIS OF POLICE USE OF FORCE
Use of force law involves an overlapping body of law including
state and federal statutory, constitutional, and common law. Claims
against police officers for excessive force can be grouped in three gen-
eral areas: (1) federal constitutional claims under the Fourth, Eighth,
or Fourteenth Amendments; (2) state statutory or common law use of
force claims, including statutory wrongful death, and common law
assault and battery-subject, of course, to North Carolina's doctrine of
public officer immunity; and (3) state constitutional claims for unrea-
sonable seizure, which can potentially be brought under article 1, sec-
tions 19, 35, and 36 of the North Carolina constitution.
There are many available defenses to use of force claims that also
arise from statutory and common law sources. Some defenses
include: (a) self defense; (b) defense of others; (c) necessity; (d) justifi-
cation; (e) state statutory defenses; (f) the force used was not unlaw-
fully excessive; (g) the officer reasonably could have believed that the
force used was appropriate; (h) law enforcement privilege; (i) crime
prevention privilege; (j) authority and duty of law; (k) assumption of
risk; (1) provocation; (m) doctrine of mistaken belief; (n) contributory
negligence; (o) lack of causation; (p) qualified immunity, which immu-
nizes officers from individual federal constitutional liability under
various circumstances; and (q) public officer immunity, which immu-
nizes officers from state law individual liability under various
circumstances. 61
The following are some general use of force principles offered as a
preview of the more detailed analysis to follow.
1) Officer perception in light of the particular circumstances is
often the key factor for reasonableness analysis in most use of force
cases.
Vaden, 912 F.2d 780 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Golden, 671 F.2d 369 (10th Cir.
1982).
60. See J. Michael McGuinness, Shootings by Police Officers Are Analyzed Under
Standards Based on Objective Reasonableness, 72 N.Y. ST. B. AsS'N J. 17 (2000).
61. See for example the cases cited in notes 464-73; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
401(d)(2) (providing that an officer may use deadly force when it "appears to be
reasonably necessary" to protect "himself or a third person"); see also ISIDORE SILVER,
POLICE CIVIL LIABILITY § 6.03[2] (1996); EssiCA SMITH, NORTH CAROLINA CRIMES: A
GUIDEBOOK ON THE ELEMENTS OF CRIME 12 (6th ed. 2007).
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2) The amount of force that was necessary is judged from the per-
spective of a reasonable officer on the particular scene confronted with
the particular circumstances, without retrospective analysis. This split-
second decision-making standard is extremely deferential to officer
perception and discretion.
3) Reasonable mistakes by an officer based upon good faith
beliefs will typically insulate officers from liability.
4) Analysis of the use of force is keyed to the facts at the precise
moment that the force is used. Ten minutes of rational conduct by a
suspect, followed by a quick, threatening movement typically justifies
the use of force.
5) The use of force continuum theory is not the law and is not
enforceable. This theory involves initial verbal persuasion, commands,
and warnings. It then progresses to the use of a lesser means of force
where feasible and safe, such as tasers, batons, pepper spray, or a
canine. The continuum progressively evolves from a show of force to
the use of force. As the risk gets progressively more severe and the
magnitude and intensity of the threat to surrounding officers
increases, officers resort to more efficient weapons to stop the threat
and control the suspect. However, nothing in the continuum theory
precludes the immediate use of deadly force where the officer could
have reasonably believed that deadly force was appropriate.
6) Although the degree of force should theoretically be commen-
surate with the magnitude of the apparent threat, use of force law does
not allow admission of evidence that there were less drastic means
available. The test is determining whether the officer's actions were
objectively reasonable and if the officer could have reasonably believed
that the force used was appropriate.
7) The display of potentially deadly weapons, which includes
edged weapons, heavy objects, broken bottles, vehicles, and other
means of potential death, usually justifies deadly force where the
officer could have reasonably believed that the weapon could have
been used to kill the officer or others. The display of a gun virtually
always justifies deadly force. Even with the barrel pointed down or
away, a flick of movement can aim and fire it before an officer can
initiate preemptive action. A real weapon need not be present; an
officer is required to act to protect himself or herself and third persons
from apparent threats and weapons.
8) Bullet trajectory and the number of shots fired do not deter-
mine the issues of reasonableness of force or justification. Back and
side shot cases are often justifiable because of the lag time and reac-
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tionary gap phenomenon. Suspects can turn quicker than an officer
can fire a weapon.
9) Factors demonstrating justification are key points for analysis
in most use of force cases. Justification involves a comprehensive anal-
ysis of both facts, perceptions by the officer as to the need for force,
and the officer's belief as to the applicable law.
10) Agency use of force policies and other rules and regulations
are irrelevant and inadmissible in civil actions adjudicating alleged
excessive force. The legal standard is objective reasonableness, which
cannot be determined by any agency policy or rules. Departmental
use of force policy is not enforceable as a claim in a civil action. While
departmental policies may be appropriate as general guidelines and
training for officers, the enforceable law derives from constitutional,
statutory, and common law sources. Thus, even a violation of a
department use of force guideline is irrelevant and inadmissible in use
of force litigation. Local policies are not the law.62
11) The determination of whether the force used is excessive
under the Fourth Amendment involves application of a balancing test
whereby the court considers "the nature and quality of the intrusion
on the [suspect's] Fourth Amendment interests [balanced] against the
countervailing governmental interests. '63 Many cases reflect the bal-
ancing of relevant factors. 6
4
In Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court defined the constitu-
tional standard governing claims for excessive force during an arrest,
investigatory stop, or other seizure as requiring objective reasonable-
ness.65 The Court explained that judging the reasonableness of force
under the Fourth Amendment requires analysis of the facts and cir-
cumstances of each particular case, including: (1) the severity of the
62. See, e.g., Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 196 & n.13 (1984) (holding that there
is no loss of qualified immunity merely because the conduct violated a statutory or
administrative provision); Abney v. Coe, 493 F.3d 412, 419 (4th Cir. 2007);
Thompson v. City of Chicago, 472 F.3d 444, 454-55 (7th Cir. 2006); Medina v. Cram,
252 F.3d 1124, 1131-32 (10th Cir. 2001); Mettler v. Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1203
(8th Cir. 1999); Ensley v. Soper, 142 F.3d 1402, 1407 n.4 (11th Cir. 1998); Gravely v.
Madden, 142 F.3d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 1998); Wilson v. Meeks, 52 F.3d 1547, 1554
(10th Cir. 1995); Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 346-47 (6th Cir. 1992); Carter v.
Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328 (7th Cir. 1992); Edwards v. Baer, 863 F.2d 606, 608 (8th Cir.
1988).
63. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
64. See, e.g., Smith v. Mattox, 127 F.3d 1416, 1419 (11th Cir. 1997); Phillips v.
City of Milwaukee, 123 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 1997).
65. Graham, 490 U.S. at 388.
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crime; (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the
officers or others; (3) whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest;
and (4) whether the suspect was attempting to evade arrest by flight.66
Although this Article focuses on use of force under Fourth
Amendment analysis, there are, as indicated above, other constitu-
tional bases for use of force claims. Where excessive force is used
against a convicted prisoner, the claim is analyzed under the Eighth
Amendment to determine whether cruel and unusual punishment has
been applied.67 The appropriate test to be applied is the standard of
recklessness, deliberate indifference, or callous indifference, which
most courts use interchangeably. 6 This test has been characterized as
just "not giving a damn.'' 69 In situations involving denial of medical
care, a version of the "shocks the conscience" substantive due process
test will apply.70 The Supreme Court has not decided what specific
constitutional test is implicated where a pretrial detainee is subjected
to excessive force.7' Several courts have held that Graham Fourth
Amendment standards apply in the period between arrest and initial
court appearances.72 Other courts have employed a substantive due
process approach or some hybrid test to such circumstances. 73
III. THE NORTH CAROLINA STATUTORY STANDARD: SECTION 15A-401
A. Reasonable Necessity from the Officer's Perspective
Section 15A-401(d)(2) of the North Carolina General Statues pro-
vides the applicable standard governing the use of force in North Caro-
lina in connection with the apprehension of criminal suspects. 4 This
statute codifies the rights, duties, and privileges of officers to employ
force in the defense of others and self defense. 75  Section 15A-
401(d)(2) provides, in pertinent part, that:
66. Id. at 396.
67. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).
68. See Bordanaro v. McLeod, 871 F.2d 1151, 1164 (1st Cir. 1989).
69. Id.
70. See Nerren v. Livingston Police Dep't, 86 F.3d 469, 474 (5th Cir. 1996).
71. See Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713, 715 (8th Cir. 2000).
72. See id. at 715-16. But see Orem v. Rephann, 523 F.3d 442, 446 (4th Cir. 2008)
(indicating that excessive force claims of a pretrial detainee or arrestee are governed by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Sammons v. Barker, No. 2:07-
00132, 2008 WL 1968843, at *7 (S.D.W. Va. May 2, 2008).
73. See Leary v. Livingston County, 528 F.3d 438, 443 (6th Cir. 2008); Riley v.
Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1166 (4th Cir. 1997).
74. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-401(d)(2) (2007).
75. See SILVER, supra note 61, at 6-12 ("A police officer making an otherwise valid
arrest is legally privileged to use reasonably necessary force to effect a custody.").
446 [Vol. 31:431
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A law-enforcement officer is justified in using deadly physical force
upon another person ... when it is or appears to be reasonably neces-
sary thereby . . . [t]o defend himself or a third person from what he
reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical
force; ... (or] [t]o effect an arrest or to prevent the escape from custody
of a person who he reasonably believes is attempting to escape by
means of a deadly weapon, or who by his conduct or any other means
indicates that he presents an imminent threat of death or serious phys-
ical injury to others unless apprehended without delay .... 76
This statutory provision recognizes three essential concepts: (1)
how the situation "appears" to the officer can justify the force used; (2)
the use of force requires "reasonable" necessity; and (3) the officer's
perspective is the basis for analysis.77
North Carolina common law recognizes that "an officer is pre-
sumed to be acting lawfully while in the exercise of his official
duties."78 It also recognizes a "privilege to intervene in the context of a
supposed felonious assault . . . ."' Section 15A-401 provides both a
statutory standard and privilege80 for law enforcement officers that is
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-401(d)(2).
77. Id.
78. State v. Anderson, 253 S.E.2d 48, 52 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979).
79. Id.
80. In North Carolina v. Reuben Hassell, the Honorable Richard Allsbrook, Superior
Court Judge presiding, instructed the jury on use of force issues in the criminal case
against Officer Hassell:
Since the Defendant, Reuben Hassell, Jr., was acting in his capacity as a
police officer in the Washington Police Department at the time of this
incident on March 24, 1998, and since he then was attempting to affect a
lawful arrest, there are some special instructions that you need to consider as
you deliberate upon your verdict in this case.
Police officers have a duty to apprehend lawbreakers, and society has a
strong interest in allowing the police to carry out that duty without fear of
being subjected to criminal liability just because someone is injured. North
Carolina General Statute 15A-401 entitled "Arrest by law-enforcement
officer" provides in part as follows: An officer may arrest without a warrant
any person who the officer has probable cause to believe has committed a
criminal offense in the officer's presence. A law enforcement officer is
justified in using force upon another person when and to the extent that he
reasonably believes it necessary to effect an arrest of a person who he
reasonably believes has committed a criminal offense. And a law
enforcement officer is justified in using deadly physical force upon another
person only when it is or appears to be reasonably necessary thereby to
defend himself from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent
use of deadly physical force. Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed
to excuse or justify the use of an unreasonable or excessive force. An officer
of the law has the right to use such force as he may reasonably believe
17
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consistent with the common law as well as contemporary decisions by
the United States Supreme Court regarding the use of force.8" Several
cases have demonstrated that section 15A-401(d)(2) "was designed
solely to codify and clarify those situations in which a police officer
may use deadly force without fear of incurring criminal or civil
liability. 82
necessary in the proper discharge of his duties to effect an arrest. But in
reasonable limits, the officer is properly left with the discretion to determine
the amount of force required under the circumstances as they appeared to
him at the time of the arrest. An officer, in making an arrest or preventing an
escape, either in case of felony or misdemeanor, may meet force with force,
sufficient to overcome it, even to the taking of life if necessary, and he is not
required under such circumstances to afford the accused equal opportunities
with him in the struggle. He is not bound to put off the arrest until a more
favorable time. His duty is to overcome all resistance and to bring the party
to be arrested under physical restraint, and the means he may use must be
coextensive with the duty, and so the law is written.
If the offender put the life of an officer in jeopardy, the latter in self-
defense may slay him. But he must be careful not to use any greater force
than is reasonable and apparently necessary under the circumstances, for
necessity, real or apparent, is the ground upon which the law permits such
action. However, where officers of the law engaged in making arrests or
acting in good faith and forces required to be used, their conduct should not
be weighed in golden scales. Stated somewhat differently, every arrest
officers make involves either a threatened or active use of force. Essentially
the officers themselves decide how much force is necessary under the
circumstances to bring the arrestees within their custody and control.
However, they are entitled to use only as much force as is reasonably
necessary to secure the arrestee, overcome resistance, prevent escape, or
protect themselves from bodily injury. They may never use more force than
is necessary to accomplish this purpose. In determining the amount of force
required, an officer may consider all of the circumstances surrounding the
arrest, such as the type of offense, the arrestee's reputation for violence, the
arrestee's words or actions, and whether the arrestee is armed or is
apparently armed. The amount of force must not be excessive considering
the circumstances.
McGuinness, supra note 9, at 210 n.39. Judge Allsbrook later gave specific
instructions regarding self-defense and apparent danger.
81. See Isquierdo v. Frederick, 922 F. Supp. 1072, 1076 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
82. State v. Irick, 231 S.E.2d 833, 846 (N.C. 1977). See Prior v. Pruett, 550 S.E.2d
166, 172 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). Cf. Sossamon v. Cruse, 45 S.E. 757, 759 (N.C. 1903)
(discussing early common law use of force).
In his criminal procedure treatise, Professor Irving Joyner has outlined the
principles regarding "Use of Deadly Force by Police Officers" as follows: "A police
officer is justified in using deadly force when it is or appears to be reasonably
necessary. . . [t]o defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to
be the use or imminent use of deadly physical force ...." IRVING JOYNER, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE IN NORTH CAROLINA § 3.4 (1st ed. 1989). Professor Joyner observed that
448
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A number of North Carolina cases have construed section 15A-
401. In State v. Anderson, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
explained:
An officer of the law has the right to use such force as he may
reasonably believe necessary in the proper discharge of his duties to
effect an arrest.... [T]he officer is properly left with the discretion to
determine the amount of force required under the circumstances as they
appeared to him at the time of the arrest.8 3
In use of force cases, officers have considerable discretion and lat-
itude in determining whether force is necessary and, if so, the extent of
the force needed.8 4 In Todd v. Creech, the court of appeals reaffirmed
the principle that an officer "has discretion to determine the amount of
force required under the circumstances as they appeared to him at the
time he acted."85 The amount of force that an officer may utilize is that
which appears "necessary from the viewpoint of the officer." 6 This
"officer viewpoint" standard is a critically important principle because
it eliminates the possibility of after-the-fact second-guessing by judges
and jurors not confronting the split-second and often life-threatening
environment that surrounded the officer's actual decision.
In Hinton v. City of Raleigh, the court of appeals held that the
officer was entitled to shoot the suspect when the suspect failed to halt
all movement when ordered to do so by the officer. The court noted
that the decedent was under a "duty... to submit when ordered to do
so by the officers. '"8 The officer had a "right of self defense" provided
by section 15A-401(d)(2)(a).89 The court determined that the dece-
dent's "crouching" and movement "pointing toward the officers" was
sufficient to justify the use of deadly force.90 Moreover, in State v. Bur-
ton, the court of appeals held that if an officer is attempting a lawful
even a fleeing misdemeanant may be subjected to deadly force, noting that "if the
misdemeanant poses a threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or third
persons, deadly force may be authorized." Id. (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1
(1985)).
83. 253 S.E.2d 48, 50 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (emphasis added) (citations omitted);
accord Isquierdo, 922 F. Supp. at 1076-80.
84. See, e.g., Morrison v. Martin, 755 F. Supp. 683, 692 (E.D.N.C. 1990); Anderson,
253 S.E.2d at 50.
85. 209 S.E.2d 293, 295 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974). See State v. McCaskill, 154 S.E.2d
907, 908-09 (N.C. 1967).
86. State v. Mensch, 239 S.E.2d 297, 299 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977).
87. 264 S.E.2d 777 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980).
88. Id. at 779.
89. Id.
90. Id.
44920091
19
McGuinness: A Primer on North Carolina and Federal Use of Force Law: Trends i
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2009
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
arrest, the officer has the right to employ commensurate force to sub-
due the arrestee and the arrestee has no right to resist.91
In State v. Fain, the North Carolina Supreme Court articulated an
excellent summary of the basic principles of the use of force and self-
defense in the law enforcement criminal context:
An officer, where he acts in self-defense may, if necessary, kill an
offender who endangers his life or safety, while attempting an arrest.
If the officer is assaulted, he is not bound to fly to the wall, but if
necessary to save his own life, or to guard his person from great bodily
harm, he may even kill the offender; this rule applies, although the
arrest is being made for a misdemeanor . . . . It is a principle very
generally accepted that an officer, having the right to arrest an
offender, may use such force as is necessary to effect his purpose, and
to a great extent he is made the judge of the degree of force that may be
properly exerted. Called on to deal with violators of the law, and not
infrequently to act in the presence of conditions importing serious
menace, his conduct in such circumstances is not to be harshly judged
.... [Hie may use the force necessary to overcome resistance and to
the extent of taking life .... 92
B. Apparent Dangers Warrant the Use of Force
If there is apparent danger to the officer or to any citizens, a law
enforcement officer is required to stop the threat to the officer or citi-
zen. 93 Police officers often have to make immediate split-second deci-
sions based on perception and apparent danger. There need not be
actual danger to the officer to justify the use of force.94 Law enforce-
ment officers are required to react to apparent dangers and apparent
weapons because normal conditions and lag time do not often allow
for an officer to ascertain, with certainty, whether a weapon is pre-
sent.95 Typical conditions in routine police encounters present the
likelihood of mistakes. The North Carolina Supreme Court has long
recognized the balance that law enforcement officers must employ:
91. 423 S.E.2d 484, 488 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992).
92. 50 S.E.2d 904, 905 (N.C. 1948) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
93. See McLenagan v. Karns, 27 F.3d 1002 (4th Cir. 2004).
94. See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 210 (2001), modified by Pearson v.
Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009); Milstead v. Kibler, 243 F.3d 157, 164 (4th Cir. 2001);
Davis v. Freels, 583 F.2d 337, 341 (7th Cir. 1978). The Fourth Circuit has similarly
construed the Fourth Amendment and has also provided qualified immunity where an
officer could have reasonably believed that deadly force was necessary. For example,
see Carr v. Deeds, 453 F.3d 593, 600 (4th Cir. 2006) and cases cited therein.
95. See McLenagan, 27 F.3d at 1007.
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[Tihe police on an occasion calling for fast action have obligations
that tend to tug against each other. Their duty is to restore and main-
tain lawful order, while not exacerbating disorder more than necessary
to do their jobs. They are supposed to act decisively and to show
restraint at the same moment, and their decisions have to be made in
"haste, under pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a second
chance." 96
In State v. Marsh, the North Carolina Supreme Court explained:
The right to act in self-defense rests upon necessity, real or appar-
ent, and a person may use such force as is necessary or apparently
necessary to save himself from death or great bodily harm in the law-
ful exercise of his right of self-defense. A person may exercise such
force if he believes it to be necessary and has reasonable grounds for
such belief.97
Courts have recognized that a police officer is not required to
await the "glint of steel" before he or she can act to preserve his or her
own safety. 98 Generally, once the "'glint of steel' [appears,] ... it is too
late to take safety precautions." 99
In Davis v. Freels, a leading police shooting case, the Seventh Cir-
cuit explained:
It is not necessary that the danger which gave rise to the belief actually
existed; it is sufficient that the person resorting to self-defense at the
time involved reasonably believed in the existence of such a danger,
and such reasonable belief is sufficient even where it is mistaken.' 00
Law enforcement officers are trained to evaluate human behavior
as a part of their basic functions. Attempts to evade the officer, as well
as furtive glances, sudden turns, and ignoring requests to bring one's
hands into view, are common indicia of behavior that demonstrates
reasonable suspicion and prospective danger. 10' Police encounters
often occur at night, which substantially limits vision and enhances
risk to everyone. Criminals often flee and take cover in uncertain ter-
rain, thus putting officers at a further disadvantage.
96. Parish v. Hill, 513 S.E.2d 547, 556 (N.C. 1999) (quoting Whitely v. Albers, 475
U.S. 312, 320 (1986)).
97. 237 S.E.2d 745, 747 (N.C. 1977).
98. See People v. Morales, 603 N.Y.S.2d 319 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
99. Id. at 320.
100. 583 F.2d 337, 341 (7th Cir. 1978).
101. See, e.g., People v. Warren, 613 N.Y.S.2d 375, 376 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994);
People v. Alonzo, 580 N.Y.S.2d 298, 299 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); People v. Rodriguez,
575 N.Y.S.2d 911, 912 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
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The most common gesture-which fuels the need for the use of
force-is the reach towards a pocket or the waistband area.' °2 In People
v. Benjamin, the New York Court of Appeals explained:
It is quite apparent to an experienced police officer, and indeed it
may almost be considered common knowledge, that a handgun is
often carried in the waistband. It is equally apparent that law-abiding
persons do not normally step back while reaching to the rear of the
waistband, with both hands, to where such a weapon may be carried.
Although such action may be consistent with innocuous behavior, it
would be unrealistic to require [the police] .. to assume the risk that
the defendant's conduct was in fact innocuous or innocent. ... It
would, indeed, be absurd to suggest that a police officer has to await
the glint of steel before he can act to preserve his safety.'0 3
These cases recognize the fundamental tenet of law enforcement
decision-making in split second environments: there is not time for
armchair reflection and reflective analysis. 104
It is essential to note that "[tlhe Fourth Amendment does not
require police officers to wait until a suspect shoots to confirm that a
serious threat of harm exists."'01 5 An officer is not required to shoot to
wound,'' nor is an officer required to use a minimum of force to
apprehend a suspect.'0 7 Rather, the officer is required to stop the
threat. Where an officer is exposed to an imminent risk of death or
serious bodily injury, less-than-lethal force is not required. 10 8
IV. SPECIAL SELF-DEFENSE AND DEFENSE OF OTHERS PRINCIPLES
IN LAW ENFORCEMENT CASES
A. Self-Defense
The principle of self-defense is one of the foremost principles in
American jurisprudence.'0 9 The first published North Carolina case,
102. People v. Benjamin, 414 N.E.2d 645 (N.Y. 1980). Recent cases show that
resorting to a vehicle may similarly provide a reasonable grounds for a belief that the
officer is in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury. See infra Part VIID.
103. Benjamin, 414 N.E.2d at 648. See People v. Marquez, 563 N.Y.S.2d 987, 990
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) ("Scarcely a day goes by in New York City during which an
innocent life is not lost to firearms wielded by criminals.").
104. See Sigman v. Town of Chapel Hill, 161 F.3d 782, 787 (4th Cir. 1998).
105. Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640, 643 (4th Cir. 1996).
106. See Clark v. Evans, 840 F.2d 876, 883 (11th Cir. 1988).
107. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
108. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-401(d)(2)(a) (2007).
109. See New Orleans & N.E.R.R. Co. v. Jopes, 142 U.S. 18, 23 (1891) (illustrating
that the right to self-defense developed very early in Anglo-American jurisprudence).
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State v. Davis, recognizing self-defense dates back to 1859." In a case
from 1877, the North Carolina Supreme Court observed how the right
to self-defense involves "the very instinct and constitution of [a man's]
being." ' 1 In 1927, the court pronounced that "[t]he first law of
nature is that of self-defense."'1 12 The right to claim self-defense has
been long recognized as a fundamental right, as it is "deeply rooted in
our traditions."' 1 3 Therefore, this historic right of self-defense is not
easily trumped in alleged excessive force litigation.
Leading North Carolina cases demonstrate the application of the
doctrine of self-defense in the law enforcement use of force context.
These cases provide for a standard that is very deferential to good faith
judgment calls made by officers. In a leading case, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals explained:
An officer of the law has the right to use such force as he may
reasonably believe necessary in the proper discharge of his duties to
effect an arrest .... [Tihe officer is properly left with the discretion to
determine the amount of force required under the circumstances as
they appeared to him at the time of the arrest. 1 14
An officer "has discretion to determine the amount of force
required under the circumstances as they appear[ I to him at the time
he act[s].""' 5 Additionally, "[an officer, in making an arrest or
preventing an escape, either in case of felony or misdemeanor, may
meet force with force, sufficient to overcome it, even to the taking of
life if necessary. '116
The danger necessary for self-defense must only be apparent dan-
ger, such that would cause a reasonable person to believe that he or
she was in danger of death or great bodily harm. 11 7 Thus, actual dan-
110. 52 N.C. 52 (1859) (referring to self-defense as a natural right).
111. State v. Turpin, 77 N.C. 473, 476 (1877).
112. State v. Holland, 138 S.E. 8, 10 (N.C. 1927).
113. Taylor v. Withrow, 288 F.3d 846, 851-52 (6th Cir. 2002) ("Blackstone referred
to self-defense as 'the primary law of nature,' and claimed that 'it is not, neither can it
be in fact, taken away by the law of society."' (citations omitted)). Many dated and
modern cases have emphatically reaffirmed the constitutional right of self-defense.
See, e.g., State v. Hardy, 397 N.E.2d 773, 776 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978) (holding that the
constitutional right of self-defense is grounded in both the Federal and Ohio
Constitutions).
114. State v. Anderson, 253 S.E.2d 48, 50 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (citations omitted).
115. Todd v. Creech, 209 S.E.2d 293, 295 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974). See Myrick v.
Cooley, 371 S.E.2d 492, 496 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
116. Holloway v. Moser, 136 S.E. 375, 377 (N.C. 1927).
117. See State v. Herbin, 259 S.E.2d 263, 267 (N.C. 1979) ("The burden is upon the
State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense
when there is some evidence in the case that he did."); State v. Goode, 107 S.E.2d 70
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ger is not the issue; rather, apparent danger as it reasonably appears to
the officer is sufficient to establish self-defense." 8 The North Carolina
Supreme Court explained this principle, stating:
The right to act in self-defense rests upon necessity, real or appar-
ent, and a person may use such force as is necessary or apparently
necessary to save himself from death or great bodily harm in the law-
ful exercise of his right of self-defense. A person may exercise such
force if he believes it to be necessary and has reasonable grounds for
such belief." 9
Moreover, an officer "acting in self-defense is presumed to have
acted in good faith."' 12
In State v. Brannon, the North Carolina Supreme Court addressed
a homicide case involving an officer who was attacked with a pool
cue. '2 The Court in Brannon explained that "if the offender put the
life of the officer in jeopardy, the latter may se defendendo slay him."' 22
It added that "[a]s against those who defy its decrees and threaten vio-
lence to its officers, the law commands that its mandates be executed,
peaceably, if they can, forcibly if they must. '"123
B. Defense of Others
Numerous cases recognize the right to come to the defense of a
third party. 124 This doctrine has special application for police officers
because of their duty to defend and protect others. For example, in
State v. Foster, an officer was acquitted of manslaughter charges after
he shot several times at a suspect's car-resulting in the suspect's
death-in response to another officer's call for help.' 25 The court, in
Foster, reasoned that "a person can come to the defense of another
(N.C. 1959); State v. Hand, 86 S.E. 1005 (N.C. 1915); see also Tennon v. Ricketts, 642
F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1981); Holloway v. McElroy, 632 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1980).
118. See State v. Jones, 261 S.E.2d 1, 7 (N.C. 1980); State v. Jackson, 200 S.E.2d
596, 601 (N.C. 1973).
119. State v. Marsh, 237 S.E.2d 745, 747 (N.C. 1977).
120. State v. Ellis, 86 S.E.2d 272, 274 (N.C. 1955).
121. 67 S.E.2d 633 (N.C. 1951).
122. Id. at 638 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Miller, 149 S.E. 590, 592 (N.C.
1929)).
123. Id. at 637 (quoting jury instructions from the trial court, and holding that they
were not in error).
124. See, e.g., State v. Church, 51 S.E.2d 345, 347 (N.C. 1949) (holding that the
defendant has a right to defend a family member against threat of death or great
bodily harm); State v. Anderson, 253 S.E.2d 48, 52 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that
a bystander may come to the defense of an arrestee only when the arrestee would
himself be justified in using force).
125. 396 N.E.2d 246 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1979).
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person and even kill an assailant in the necessary defense of the other
person."'
1 26
A person may intervene and use force against another when it
appears reasonably necessary in order to protect a third person from
harm.127 Moreover, when an officer has a reasonable belief that a felo-
nious assault is about to be committed, the officer has the right and
the duty to intervene and prevent it. 1 28 In support of these statements,
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in State v. Robinson, held that the
jury may be instructed on both self-defense and crime prevention
aspects of defense of others. 129
V. STATE LAW USE OF FORCE STANDARDS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Various state appellate courts have similarly recognized the appro-
priateness of deferential standards in alleged law enforcement use of
force cases. Thus, North Carolina's substantial deference to police
officers is consistent with the national majority rule. The constant dif-
ficulties and inherent dangers in law enforcement must be considered
in the use of force inquiry. For example, in Johnson v. Ray, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed that police officers, in the
course of making an arrest, are privileged to use whatever force is rea-
sonably necessary. 130 The court held that the test of reasonableness
focused upon the particular belief of the officer involved.' 3 1 Further-
more, in State v. Thompson, the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that
the use of force is justifiable when an officer is making or assisting in
the making of an arrest and the officer believes that such force is
necessary. 132
In State v. Foster, the defendant was a law enforcement officer
charged with voluntary manslaughter arising out of a shooting. 133 In
discussing the facts, the Court of Common Pleas of Ohio stated that:
Officer Foster, armed with a Smith and Wesson, Model 10, .38 caliber
revolver, discharged five rounds of the six available rounds as the car
proceeded toward and past him. Two of the rounds discharged, struck
the front of ... [the] automobile .... After the first two shots, [the
criminal suspect] was observed bending down toward the passenger's
126. Id. at 257 (citing Greger v. State, 161 N.E. 37 (Ohio Ct. App. 1927)).
127. See State v. Hornbuckle, 144 S.E.2d 12, 14 (N.C. 1965).
128. See id. at 14; State v. Moses, 193 S.E.2d 288, 289 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972).
129. 195 S.E. 824, 829-30 (N.C. 1938).
130. 299 N.W.2d 849, 852 (Wis. 1981).
131. Id.
132. 505 N.W.2d 673, 680 (Neb. 1993).
133. 396 N.E.2d 246, 248 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1979).
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side. As the ... vehicle continued toward Officer Foster, Officer Foster
kept from being struck by the vehicle by moving to the east side of
Dublin Road where he continued to fire three more shots. 134
The court analyzed the law of Ohio regarding the use of force by
police officers, and addressed the issue of whether the use of deadly
force, in order to be privileged, must be "actually necessary" or "appar-
ently necessary" .13  The court held that "[t]he majority view today
requires only 'apparent necessity,'"" 3 6 and that "the courts will ordina-
rily afford [police officers] the utmost protection.' '1 37
VI. ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGY IN USE OF FORCE CASES: THE
"REASONABLENESS OF THE MOMENT" TEST AND THE
"COULD HAVE BELIEVED" STANDARD
A. The "Reasonableness of the Moment" Test
The United States Supreme Court and lower courts have struc-
tured a contextual test for the analysis of law enforcement use of force
claims.'1 3  Most of these cases apply federal constitutional standards
but the methodology is equally applicable to state-based claims. This
use of force methodology is grounded upon the "reasonableness of the
moment" test.1 3 9 This standard requires an assessment of force at the
precise moment of its use, rather than before- or after-the-fact consider-
ations. 4 0 The Supreme Court has long recognized the "practical diffi-
culties of attempting to assess the suspect's dangerousness."'' The
Fourth Circuit has also recognized this difficulty, indicating that "[t]o
evaluate excessive force, we view the facts from the perspective of the
officer."'1 42 Thus, the precise moment of the use of force is the context
within which the conduct is analyzed under the reasonableness test.
The Fourth Circuit is particularly clear on this point.' 43
134. Id. at 251.
135. Id. at 256.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 258 (quoting In re Removal of Pickering, 266 N.E.2d 248 (Ohio Ct. App.
1970)).
138. See e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989); Sigman v. Town of
Chapel Hill, 161 F.3d 782, 786-87 (4th Cir. 1998); Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 173
(4th Cir. 1994). Additional factors from Graham are addressed infra Part VII.A.
139. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97.
140. Id.
141. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 20 (1985).
142. Anderson v. Russell, 247 F.3d 125, 130 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Graham, 490
U.S. at 396-97).
143. See id.
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Through a settled line of cases, courts have fleshed out this "rea-
sonableness of the moment" concept. Police conduct that "may later
seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers" is not made
illegal through "20/20 vision of hindsight." '144 Cases make clear that
only the situation present at the precise moment of the use of force is
to be considered in the reasonableness inquiry. 145 One court noted
that "we scrutinize only the seizure itself, not the events leading to the
seizure, for reasonableness." 146
The Fourth Circuit has been clear that pre-seizure conduct will
not be considered as a part of determining the reasonableness of the
force. 1 4 7 This is important because it precludes plaintiffs from being
able to point to some preliminary transgression by the officer to sur-
vive summary judgment.148 The dispositive legal point for analysis
occurs at the precise moment when the force is imposed. In other
words, what did the officer then know and what could he or she have
reasonably believed?
In Greenidge v. Ruffin, the Fourth Circuit held that the conduct "at
the moment" of the use of force was the applicable test within the cir-
cuit.1 4 9 The plaintiff attempted to introduce evidence that an officer
violated departmental policy by not having a backup and by not using
a flashlight at night. 150 The Fourth Circuit held that these pre-seizure
events were not factors to be considered in the reasonableness
inquiry. 15 1 More specifically, the court in Greenidge held that viola-
144. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
145. See Schulz v. Long, 44 F.3d 643, 648 (8th Cir. 1995); Carter v. Busher, 973
F.2d 1328, 1332 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that pre-seizure conduct by the officer is not
subject to use of force scrutiny); Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1275-76
(5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting as irrelevant evidence that police officer manufactured the
circumstances that gave rise to the force); Greenidge v. Ruffin, 927 F.2d 789, 792 (4th
Cir. 1991) (stating the officer's "liability [is to] be determined exclusively upon an
examination and weighing of the information [the officer] possessed immediately
prior to and at the very moment [he] fired the fatal shot" (emphasis omitted)). When
examining the "reasonableness of the moment," courts will observe the facts at the
time that the force was used, and a violation of police policy or state law prior to that
use of force is irrelevant. Greenidge, 927 F.2d at 791 (stating officer's alleged
misconduct in failing to comply with standard practices is not to be considered). The
fact that injuries occur does not establish that the force employed was unreasonable.
See Lopez v. Robinson, 914 F.2d 486, 489 (4th Cir. 1990).
146. Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1993).
147. See Greenidge, 927 F.2d at 791.
148. See id.; Fraire, 957 F.2d at 1275-76.
149. Greenidge, 927 F.2d at 792.
150. Id. at 791.
151. Id. at 792.
457
27
McGuinness: A Primer on North Carolina and Federal Use of Force Law: Trends i
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2009
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
tions of departmental policy are not to be considered in the reasona-
bleness inquiry."'
Even where an officer has created the need for force, the pre-
seizure conduct is not to be considered in the reasonableness inquiry:
[The officer's] actions leading up to the shooting are irrelevant to the
objective reasonableness of his conduct at the moment he decided to
employ deadly force. The reasonableness inquiry depends only on the
officer's knowledge of the circumstances immediately prior to and at
the moment he made the split second decision to use deadly force.' 53
In Elliot v. Leavitt, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed the "reasonable-
ness of the moment" test, including the irrelevance of pre-use of force
conduct. 154 According to the facts of the case, an officer allegedly
failed to adequately search the suspect. 1 55 The Fourth Circuit con-
cluded that such pre-seizure conduct was "irrelevant" to the excessive
force inquiry. 156 In Drewitt v. Pratt, the Fourth Circuit similarly con-
cluded that an officer's actions prior to shooting, including whether he
could have jumped out of the way, were irrelevant to the excessive force
inquiry. 157 Even if the officer had unreasonably provoked the shoot-
ing, the analysis does not change; reasonableness is determined at the
moment of the use of force and earlier conduct of the officer is irrele-
vant. Despite common claims by plaintiffs' experts that a police shoot-
ing violated some ill defined "police practices standard" or
departmental or other policy, such unauthorized conduct does not
constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness
standard. 1
58
152. Id. Scores of cases similarly prohibit use or admission of an officer's violations
of agency policy or of "good police procedure." See, e.g., Young v. City of Killeen, 775
F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1985) (involving claims that the officer violated "good police
procedure" in six ways, including failing to use his radio, failure to use a back up,
dangerous placement of his vehicle, ordering suspects to exit their car rather than
issuing an immobilization command, and abandoning a covered position).
153. Salim v. Proulx, 93 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 1996). See Schultz v. Long, 44 F.3d
643, 649 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that evidence that the officers "created the need for
force by their actions prior to the moment of the seizure is irrelevant"); Randall v.
Peaco, 927 A.2d 83, 91 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007).
154. 99 F.3d 640, 645 (4th Cir. 1996).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 643.
157. 999 F.2d. 774, 780 (4th Cir. 1993). See Livermore ex. rel. Rohm v. Lubelan,
476 F.3d 397, 406 (6th Cir. 2007).
158. See, e.g., Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 (1984); Abney v. Coe, 493 F.3d
412, 419 (4th Cir. 2007); Ensley v. Soper, 142 F.3d 1402, 1407 n.4 (11th Cir. 1998);
Gravely v. Madden, 142 F.3d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 1998); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d
1480, 1491 (11th Cir. 1996); Reynolds v. County of San Deigo, 84 F.3d 1162, 1170
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Use of force law also does not allow admission of evidence that
may suggest that the officer had less drastic or less intrusive alterna-
tives available. 159 In Plakas v. Drinski, the Seventh Circuit held that
police officers are not required "to use the least intrusive or even less
intrusive alternatives.' 160 Rather, the court concluded that "[t]he only
test is whether what the police officers actually did was reasonable."''
In Scott v. Henrich, the Ninth Circuit held that police officers are not
required to use the "least intrusive alternative" before responding with
deadly force. 162 Similarly, officers are not required to wait for backup
to arrive before shooting at a suspect.'63 As the Eighth Circuit, in
Schulz v. Long, explained: "Alternative measures which 20/20 hind-
sight reveal to be less intrusive (or more prudent), such as waiting for a
supervisor or the SWAT team, are simply not relevant to the reasona-
bleness inquiry." '164
B. The "Could Have Believed" Standard
Courts now routinely apply the "could have believed" standard in
use of force litigation. In Hunter v. Bryant, the Supreme Court adopted
the "could have believed" standard, which absolves the officer of liabil-
ity "if a reasonable officer could have believed [the conduct in issue] to
be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the
[arresting] officers possessed.' 1 65 The Fourth Circuit has also consist-
ently applied the "could have believed" standard. 6 6 Additionally, in
Prior v. Pruett, the North Carolina Court of Appeals recognized the
"could have believed" standard under federal law.' 6 7
In Wyche v. City of Franklinton, it was alleged that a police officer
used excessive force in shooting the decedent after a confrontation. 68
(9th Cir. 1996); Wilson v. Meeks, 52 F.3d 1547, 1554 (10th Cir. 1995); Edwards v.
Baer, 863 F.2d 606, 608 (8th Cir. 1988).
159. See Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1983) (stating reasonableness of
governmental activity does not turn on existence of alternative "less intrusive" means);
Schulz v. Long, 44 F.3d 643, 649 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating officers are not required to
"pursue the most prudent course of conduct as judged by 20/20 hindsight").
160. 19 F.3d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1994).
161. Id.
162. 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994).
163. See Mettler v. Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1203 (8th Cir. 1999).
164. Schulz, 44 F.3d at 649.
165. 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).
166. See, e.g., Park v. Shifflett, 250 F.3d 843, 853 (4th Cir. 2001); Rowland v. Perry,
41 F.3d 167, 173 (4th Cir. 1994).
167. 550 S.E.2d 166, 168 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
168. 837 F. Supp. 137, 139 (E.D.N.C. 1993).
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The decedent had been acting in a bizarre manner, thus causing a con-
venience store clerk to summon police to the scene. 169 Officer Cald-
well responded and the decedent appeared unarmed; however, the
officer observed the decedent reach behind him and, fearing a weapon,
the officer shot the decedent in the leg. 170 As the decedent continued
to advance, the officer shot him a second time, killing him.17 ' The
court, utilizing the "could have believed" standard, noted that "Cald-
well is entitled to qualified immunity if he can establish that, in light of
the clearly established principles governing the use of force to effect an
arrest, he could, as a matter of law, reasonably have believed that his
use of deadly force was lawful.'
'1 72
In Pittman v. Nelms, the Fourth Circuit held as a matter of law that
a police officer did not use excessive force in shooting a fleeing suspect
from the rear. 173 In Pittman, two officers, Banks and Nelms, pulled
over a car belonging to a suspected drug dealer. 174 After approaching
the car, Banks leaned inside to speak to the driver, Hudson, who drove
off with Officer Banks' arm still stuck inside the window. 175 After
Banks was thrown clear of the car, Nelms fired his gun hitting a pas-
senger, Pittman, in the back.' 76 The court explained that "[i]n light of
Graham .. .we cannot conclude that the force Nelms used was exces-
sive under clearly established law."'17 7 The court further reasoned that
"an objectively reasonable officer certainly could have believed that his
decision to fire was legally justified."'178
In Klein v. Ryan, the Seventh Circuit held that a reasonable officer
in the position of the defendant-officers could have believed that the
use of deadly force was justified.' 79 The officers had been investigat-
ing the burglary of a laundromat. 8 ° Using surveillance photos, the
officers identified a suspect, Klein.' 8 ' One night while surveying the
area around the laundromat, they spotted Klein in a car a few feet away
169. Id.
170. Id. at 140.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 141-42.
173. 87 F.3d 116, 120 (4th Cir. 1996).
174. Id. at 118.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 120.
178. Id.
179. 847 F.2d 368, 375 (7th Cir. 1988).
180. Id. at 369.
181. Id.
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from the laundromat.18 2 Klein entered the laundromat and proceeded
to open the machines and remove the money. 18 3 After obtaining
backup, several officers took strategic positions outside the Laundro-
mat and, as Klein exited, one of the officers commanded him to
halt. 184 Klein did not heed the warning and ran for his car. 185 As he
fled, Klein was positioned between the two officers, one to the east and
one to the west.18 6
After he got to his car, Klein started the engine and began backing
up.'8 7 An officer then jumped out of the way and, after regaining his
position, fired two shots at Klein as he fled the scene.' 88 Klein was
later captured after checking into the hospital to be treated for gunshot
wounds.' 89 The court determined that the actions taken by the
defendants in attempting to stop the fleeing suspect were reasonable as
a matter of law.' 90 In its analysis, the Seventh Circuit explained that,
Police officers tell a person, who they reasonably suspect of having
committed a forcible felony, to halt. They reasonably believe that the
suspect heard them, but the suspect continues to flee. The suspect gets
in the car and begins to drive away, with no resistance from any other
officer. In this situation, a police officer could reasonably believe that
deadly force was "necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated
by resistance or escape." 191
VII. G-AHAm, GARNER, SAUCIER, AND SCOTT PROVIDE THE
FEDERAL USE OF FORCE TESTS
A. Graham v. Connor and Excessive Force
The controlling federal use of force standards are virtually identi-
cal to the North Carolina standards. In Graham v. Connor, the
Supreme Court clarified the parameters of use of force principles. 192
The Court explained that:
"[Tlhe test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not
capable of precise definition or mechanical application," however, its
proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circum-
182. Id.
183. Id. at 390.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 369-71.
190. Id. at 375.
191. Id. at 373 (citations omitted).
192. 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).
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stances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at
issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of
the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest by flight ....
The "reasonableness" of a particular use of force must be judged
from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than
with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. The calculus of reasonableness
must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced
to make split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving-about the amount of force that is nec-
essary in a particular situation.' 9
3
In Graham, the Court was confronted with the issue of what con-
stitutional standard governs an excessive force claim against a law
enforcement officer in the course of making an arrest, investigatory
stop, or other "seizure" of the person.194 There, the plaintiff sought
damages for alleged injuries when officers used physical force against
him in the course of an investigatory stop.1 95
Plaintiff Dethorne Graham, a diabetic, had a friend drive him to a
convenience store to obtain orange juice in order to counteract an
oncoming insulin reaction. 196 Graham entered the store but hurried
out after becoming concerned about delay when he observed several
people ahead of him in line.' 97 A Charlotte police officer observed
"Graham hastily enter and leave the store."' 98 The officer became sus-
picious, followed the car in which Graham was traveling, and made an
investigatory stop.19 9 Graham's friend informed the officer that Gra-
ham was suffering from a "sugar reaction. ' 20 0 The officer told Graham
and the driver he would detain them until he had established what
occurred at the store.2 0 ' When the officer called for assistance, "Gra-
ham got out of the car, ran around it twice, and finally sat down on the
curb, and passed out briefly.
20 2
193. Id. at 396-97 (citations omitted). This "reasonableness" test was reaffirmed in
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 210 (2001).
194. Graham, 490 U.S. at 387.
195. Id. at 388.
196. Id.
197. Id.'at 388-89.
198. Id. at 389.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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Other officers arrived on the scene and handcuffed Graham.2 °3
One of the officers stated that he thought Graham was drunk.2 °4 Sev-
eral officers then lifted Graham, carried him over to his friend's car,
and placed him face down on the hood of the car.20 5 Graham's friend
brought him some orange juice in an effort to counter the diabetic
reaction, but the officers on scene refused to allow Graham to drink
it. 20 6 After the officers determined that "Graham had done nothing
wrong at the convenience store... [they] drove him home and released
him. '20 7 During the encounter, Graham suffered "a broken foot, cuts
on his wrists, a bruised forehead, an injured shoulder ... [and] a loud
ringing in his right ear."
2 0 8
Graham's complaint alleged excessive force in making the investi-
gatory stop.2 0 9 The district court directed a verdict for the officers,
finding that the use of force was appropriate under the circum-
stances. 210 The district court employed the four-factor Glick test. 211 A
divided panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed.212 Over a vigorous dis-
sent by Judge Butzner, the majority endorsed the four-factor test
applied by the district court as generally applicable to all claims of
constitutionally excessive force.213
In reviewing the Fourth Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court
began its analysis with a treatment of Johnson v. Glick.214 Speaking
through Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court observed that after Glick,
the vast majority of lower federal courts have applied Glick's four-
prong substantive due process test indiscriminately to all excessive
force claims.2 15 The Court rejected the argument that all excessive
force claims "are governed by a single generic standard. ' 21 6 Previous
lower court cases had assumed that there was a generic right to be free
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 390.
209. Id.
210. Graham v. City of Charlotte, 644 F. Supp. 246, 248 (W.D.N.C. 1986).
211. Id. (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)).
212. Graham v. City of Charlotte, 827 F.2d 945, 950 (4th Cir. 1987).
213. Id. at 948-52.
214. Graham, 490 U.S. at 392-93.
215. Id. at 393.
216. Id.
20091
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of excessive force such that it was not grounded in any particular con-
stitutional provision.2 17
In rejecting this generic type of excessive force analysis, the Gra-
ham Court instructed that the "analysis begins by identifying the spe-
cific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged
application of force."218 The Court noted that, typically, the specific
constitutional rights involved in excessive force claims will be the
Fourth and Eighth Amendments. 2 9 Accordingly, the validity of such
an excessive force claim must be "judged by reference to the specific
constitutional standard which governs that right. ' 22 ' The Court also
observed that where the excessive force claim arose in the context of an
arrest or investigatory stop, it is "most properly characterized as one
invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment .... ,,221
The holding of Graham was very specific: "[All claims that law
enforcement officers have used excessive force-deadly or not-in the
course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citi-
zen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 'reasona-
bleness' standard, rather than under a 'substantive due process'
approach.'222 The Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment pro-
vides an "explicit textual source of constitutional protection against
this sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct. '223
The Court then enunciated a balancing test to be applied on a
case-by-case basis to determine if a particular seizure is unreasonable
because of constitutionally excessive force.224 A court must balance
"'the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests' against the countervailing governmental inter-
ests at stake. '225 The Court also determined that the standard to be
applied was "reasonableness at the moment" of the seizure.226
The Court emphasized the objective nature of this reasonableness
test, stating "the 'reasonableness' inquiry in an excessive force case is
an objective one: the question is whether the officers' actions are
'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances con-
fronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motiva-
217. See, e.g., Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380, 382 (4th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
218. Graham, 490 U.S. at 394.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 395.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 396.
225. Id. (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
226. Id.
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tion.''227 Thus, under this test, considerations of concepts like malice
have no formal place in the objective reasonableness inquiry.228 The
Court's holding in Graham is quite narrow.
The concurring opinion of Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall, provides helpful guidance and raises additional
concerns.229 Justice Blackmun's concurrence primarily addressed the
issue of whether substantive due process might serve as an alternative
basis for recovery. 230 The majority's narrow holding seems to elimi-
nate the substantive due process framework in the specific law enforce-
ment context, but it did not address whether this now precludes a
plaintiff from proceeding under both theories independently. 23' How-
ever, any plaintiff with an excessive force claim that could establish
liability under the more difficult substantive due process standard
would almost necessarily be able to establish liability under the Fourth
Amendment standard. As Justice Blackmun observed, "the use of force
that is not demonstrably unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment
only rarely will raise substantive due process concerns. "232
B. Saucier v. Katz and Qualified Immunity
In Saucier v. Katz, the Court decided the issue of whether the legal
tests for qualified immunity and underlying substantive liability are
identical in law enforcement use of force cases.233 The Ninth Circuit
227. Id. See Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 869 (4th Cir. 1988); Scott v. United
States, 436 U.S. 128, 137-39 (1978) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Just
before the Court decided Graham, the Seventh Circuit, in Wilkins v. May, held that the
use of excessive force in interrogating a suspect who has been arrested but not yet
charged does not contravene the Fourth Amendment but may violate substantive due
process. 872 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff-Wilkins alleged that the officers held
a pistol pointed at his head while he was interrogated, thus causing mental distress.
Id. at 191-92. Judge Posner's opinion reasoned that since Wilkins was seized when he
was arrested, there was no seizure through pointing the gun. Id. at 192-94. The
"continuing seizure" theory was rejected. Id. at 194. Judge Posner went on to
enunciate a "shock the conscience" test. Id. at 195.
228. See Miller v. Lovett, 879 F.2d 1066, 1070 (2d Cir. 1989).
229. Graham, 490 U.S. at 399 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
230. Id. at 399-400.
231. See id. at 386 (majority opinion).
232. Id. at 400 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523
U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (enunciating a "shocks the conscience" test for vehicular police
pursuits that is grounded in Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process); Michael
Owens, Comment, The Inherent Constitutionality of the Police Use of Deadly Force to Stop
Dangerous Pursuits, 52 MERCER L. REV. 1599 (2001).
233. 533 U.S. 194, 210 (2001), modified by Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808
(2009).
465
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had earlier held that the two inquiries merged into a single
question. 234
In Saucier, an Army base in San Francisco was holding an event to
celebrate its conversion to a national park.235 Vice President Gore was
a scheduled speaker.236 Elliot Katz, concerned that the Army's hospi-
tal would be used for conducting experiments on animals, brought a
cloth banner to the event to voice his opposition.237
While waiting for Gore to speak, Katz sat in the front row of the
seating area.238 When Gore began speaking, Katz removed the banner,
started to unfold it, and walk toward the speaker's platform. 2 39 Sau-
cier, a military police officer, was on duty that day.24° Saucier "had
been warned by his superiors of the possibility of demonstrations, and
[Katz] had been identified as a potential protestor. ' '24 1 Saucier and a
sergeant recognized Katz, and they moved to intercept him as he
walked toward the speaker's platform. 242 As Katz began placing the
banner, "the officers grabbed [Katz] from behind, took the banner, and
rushed him out of the area. 243
Katz alleged that the officers used excessive force in arresting
him.24 4 The trial court concluded that Saucier was not entitled to sum-
mary judgment.245 Saucier initiated an interlocutory appeal from the
denial of qualified immunity, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.246
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that a qualified
immunity decision requires an analysis that is separate from the sub-
stantive question of whether unreasonable force was used.247 The
Court concluded that the inquiries for qualified immunity and exces-
sive force must remain distinct. 248 The Court explained that:
Because police officers are often forced to make split-second judg-
ments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolv-
234. Id. at 197.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 198.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 199.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 199-200.
248. Id.
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ing-about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular
situation, the reasonableness of the officer's belief as to the appropriate
level of force should be judged from that on-scene perspective. We set
out a test that cautioned against the 20/20 vision of hindsight in favor
of deference to the judgment of reasonable officers on the scene.2 49
The Court observed that the factors set forth in Graham deter-
mine the merits of an alleged excessive force claim, which require
''careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular
case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect
poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and
whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight. 2
50
Additionally, the Court, in Saucier, reaffirmed the doctrine of mis-
taken beliefs, which provides: "If an officer reasonably, but mistakenly,
believed that a suspect was likely to fight back, for instance, the officer
would be justified in using more force than in fact was needed." 2 5 1
The Court explained that the qualified immunity inquiry includes a
further dimension:
The concern of the immunity inquiry is to acknowledge that reasona-
ble mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on particular
police conduct. It is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine
how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the
factual situation the officer confronts. An officer might correctly per-
ceive all of the relevant facts but have a mistaken understanding as to
whether a particular amount of force is legal in those circumstances. If
the officer's mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable, however,
the officer is entitled to the immunity defense.2 52
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects law enforcement
officers from individual liability "insofar as their conduct does not vio-
late clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known. ' 253 If the law is not clearly
established, the officer is entitled to qualified immunity from suit.
However, even if the law is clearly established, the officer is still enti-
249. Id. at 205 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See Brown v.
Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 369 (4th Cir. 2002).
250. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205 (internal quotation marks omitted). See Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).
251. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. See Roberts v. McSwain, 487 S.E.2d 760 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1999) (explaining that qualified immunity protects conduct that is reasonable
although mistaken).
252. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205.
253. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
467
37
McGuinness: A Primer on North Carolina and Federal Use of Force Law: Trends i
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2009
468 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:431
tled to qualified immunity where a reasonable officer could have
believed that his or her conduct was lawful.
Saucier held that qualified immunity and the underlying substan-
tive standards for use of force claims are distinct issues even though
they both involve determinations of reasonableness from the officer's
perspective.25 4 It also emphasized the application of qualified immu-
nity for officers even where there has been a mistake which has
resulted in injury. Moreover, Saucier provided that officers are entitled
to qualified immunity from liability where their mistakes are
reasonable.255
In Brown v. Gilmore, the Fourth Circuit interpreted Saucier and
reversed a decision denying an officer's motion for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity.25 6 Brown arose out of a situation involv-
ing an alleged false arrest and use of excessive force during an arrest
for violation of a city's disorderly conduct ordinance.25 7 Brown had
been in a minor traffic accident during a holiday weekend when there
was an extremely large crowd of individuals who were visiting Myrtle
Beach, South Carolina in connection with a biker festival.25 8 Once
officers arrived at the scene of the accident, Officer Gilmore asked Ms.
Brown to move her car. 259 After the first two instructions to move the
car were ignored, Officer Gilmore asked Brown again and she contin-
ued to ignore him.260 Brown became verbally abusive and again
refused to move her car.16 1 Officer Gilmore then asked Officer Pina to
arrest Brown for disorderly conduct.262 Officer Pina escorted Brown
to his patrol cruiser, handcuffed her, and asked her to get in the
cruiser.263 Brown refused and put up a scuffle.264
The Fourth Circuit observed that there was a factual dispute
between the officers and Brown as to what occurred.265 Brown
claimed that she did not understand what the officer was saying and
was not aware that he directed her to move her car. 66 The court posed
254. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 197.
255. Id. at 205.
256. 278 F.3d 362, 365 (4th Cir. 2002).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 366.
265. Id.
266. Id.
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the issue as whether a reasonable officer would be justified in the
belief that a citizen heard his request under those circumstances.267
The Fourth Circuit noted that Brown admitted that she was stand-
ing very close to Officer Gilmore, even to the extent that he was alleg-
edly invading her personal space.266 It was also undisputed that the
other driver involved in the accident had no difficulty hearing the
request and moved her car.2 6 9 Furthermore, there was no allegation
by Brown that Officer Gilmore never told her to move her car. 270 The
court explained that:
Giving Brown the benefit of the doubt as to whether she heard the
officer's request does not strip the officers of an objectively reasonable
belief that she heard the request. In fact, a reasonable officer in this
situation would have been warranted in the belief that Brown knew full
well that she had been asked to move her automobile.27
The Fourth Circuit concluded that the circumstances encountered
by Officer Pina justified the minimal level of force that he applied.272
It also addressed the issue regarding the factual dispute as to whether
Brown had resisted arrest. The court stated that the Supreme Court
had made it clear that a "subjective clash of beliefs is not one that [the
court] need[s] to resolve. ' 273 The Fourth Circuit explained that "[i]f
an officer reasonably, but mistakenly, believed that a suspect was
likely to fight back, for instance, the officer would be justified in using
more force than in fact was needed. 274
Brown is a very instructive case to illustrate the critical point that
alleged excessive force encounters will often develop some factual
inconsistencies in the views of arrestees and the officers involved.
However, factual discrepancies do not necessarily create genuine
issues of material fact, especially where the facts demonstrate that
officers had a reasonable belief that the action taken was necessary-
even if their belief was mistaken.
C. Garner, Escapes, and the Fleeing Felon Rule
In Tennessee v. Garner, the Supreme Court explained: "[I1f the sus-
pect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to
267. Id. at 368
268. Id.
269. id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 369.
273. Id.
274. Id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 210 (2001)).
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believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or
threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be
used if necessary to prevent escape .... 275
In Garner, the Court addressed the "constitutionality of the use of
deadly force to prevent the escape of an apparently unarmed, sus-
pected felon. '276 According to the facts, officers were dispatched to
answer a "prowler inside" call.2 77 Upon arrival, the officers observed
someone on her porch gesturing toward the adjacent house.278 The
neighbor informed the officers that she had heard glass breaking and
that someone was breaking into the home. 279 The officers heard a
door slam and observed someone run across the backyard. 280 These
events occurred at approximately 10:45 at night.28' With the aid of a
flashlight, one of the officers was able to generally observe the fleeing
suspect's face and hands.28 2 He did not appear to see a weapon.283
The officer verbally commanded the suspect to halt as the suspect was
fleeing.284 The suspect attempted to climb over a fence.285 The officer
was concerned that the suspect would escape, and consequently the
suspect was shot.286 Justice White, writing for the majority, held that
the use of force was unconstitutional.287
In making this holding, the Garner Court reaffirmed application
of the constitutional balancing test for determining the constitutional-
ity of a seizure.288 It explained that, in order "[t]o determine the con-
stitutionality of a seizure, '[w]e must balance the nature and quality of
the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against
the importance of the governmental interest alleged to justify the intru-
275. 471 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985). See Milstead v. Kibler, 243 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2001);
Howerton v. Fletcher, 213 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2000); Lowery v. Stovall, 92 F.3d 219
(4th Cir. 1996). Garner must be read in conjunction with Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S.
224, 228 (1991), where the Court explained that the "could have believed standard" is
to be used in probable cause determinations for qualified immunity.
276. Garner, 471 U.S. at 3.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 4.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 7-8.
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sion."' 2 8 9 After reviewing a long line of seizure cases, the Court
observed that the question "was whether the totality of the circum-
stances justified a particular sort of search or seizure. 2 90
The Court enunciated a number of fundamental rules in Garner.
The Court concluded that "[t]he use of deadly force to prevent the
escape of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitu-
tionally unreasonable. '2 9 1 However, "[w]here the officer has probable
cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical
harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unrea-
sonable to prevent escape by using deadly force. 29 2 Thus, if the sus-
pect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to
believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or
threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be
used if necessary to prevent escape.
The essential principle from Garner is that deadly "force may not
be used unless it is necessary to prevent ... escape and the officer has
probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of
death or serious physical injury to the officer or others. '293 Thus, in
situations involving fleeing suspected felons, the Court recognized a
"probable cause" standard.2 9 4 Garner and its progeny make clear that,
where officers have probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a
significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officers or
others, officers may justifiably shoot a fleeing suspect.
Garner must be read with the more recent Supreme Court cases of
Hunter, Brosseau, and Scott. 295 Read together, these and other cases
authorize deadly force to prevent a fleeing suspect where the officer
could have reasonably believed that the suspect posed a threat of death
or serious bodily harm to the officer, other nearby officers, or the pub-
lic. Escape on foot without an apparent weapon, as in Garner, will not
justify deadly force. Escape by vehicle, on the other hand, will likely
justify deadly force if the officer reasonably could have believed that
289. Id. at 8 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
290. Id. at 8-9.
291. Id. at 11.
292. Id. The probable cause needed for qualified immunity is "only arguable
probable cause." See Montoute v. Carr, 114 F.3d 181, 184 (11th Cir. 1997) and cases
cited therein. Cf. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991) (officers entitled to
qualified immunity "if a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause
existed").
293. Garner, 471 U.S. at 3.
294. Id. at 9.
295. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194
(2004); Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (1991).
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the suspect in the vehicle posed a threat of death or serious bodily
injury to the officer or others. These and other cases demonstrate how
preemptive police action is appropriate to stop violence at the thresh-
old indication. Waiting for the course of violence to materially unfold
before stopping the threat to officers or the public is clearly not
required as long as the officer reasonably believes that there is immi-
nent danger of death or serious bodily injury.
In Garner, the determinative facts that exposed the officers to
constitutional tort liability appear to have been the lack of threat of
harm to the officers or others from the fleeing suspect. Generally,
mere flight alone without more is not sufficient to warrant deadly force
unless there is something that triggers the officer to believe (or if a
reasonable officer could have reasonably believed) that the suspect
presents a threat of death or serious bodily harm to others.296
These principles where applied in Montoute v. Carr, where an
officer responded to a call regarding a man with a gun.297 Upon arri-
val of the officer, the suspect fled with the gun. 298 After warnings to
stop were ignored, the officer shot and wounded the suspect. 29 9 The
Eleventh Circuit concluded that even though the suspect was in flight,
the weapon still posed an immediate threat to the officer. 300 Accord-
ingly, as long as the suspect retains the weapon and may be within
range of using the weapon against the officers or the public, then there
is a legitimate basis that an officer could reasonably believe that the
suspect poses an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury.
The recent vehicle flight cases provide further guidance on this
point.3 °1
When a suspect is operating, or about to operate, an automobile
near an officer,30 2 the risks to the officer may be much greater and
potentially severe if the automobile can possibly be maneuvered or
turned to strike the officer.30 3 Preemptive police actions in this con-
text are often crucial. A suspect fleeing in an automobile also poses a
great risk of death or serious injury to the motoring public because,
among other reasons, fleeing suspects are more apt to excessively
296. Garner, 471 U.S. at 3.
297. 114 F.3d 181, 182 (11th Cir. 1997).
298. Id. at 183.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 185
301. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1778 (2007).
302. A car is unquestionably a deadly weapon. See, e.g., Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d
343, 347 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Sanchez, 914 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1990);
State v. Jackson, 327 S.E.2d 270 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).
303. See, e.g., Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004).
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speed and violate other highway safety rules. If an officer reasonably
could have believed that the suspect poses a danger of death or serious
bodily harm to the officer or the public, then the officer may use
deadly force to prevent an escape or flight from apprehension by vehi-
cle. The constitutional balancing test applied by the Court in Garner
allows consideration of the "totality of circumstances," which warrants
an officer to consider a vast array of facts, circumstances, and infer-
ences-which may give rise to an officer's reasonable belief that the
suspect poses a risk to officers and citizens.30 4
In Scott v. Harris, the Supreme Court recognized that a fleeing
criminal suspect in an automobile is a danger to others on the high-
way.3 °5 The officers in Scott were required to use force to defend
others on the public highways.30 6 The Court found that such force
was appropriate and granted qualified immunity to the officers.30 7 In
powerful language, Justice Scalia's majority opinion demonstrates how
police officers, faced with the choice of whether to pursue a criminal
suspect, cannot gamble with public safety when the suspect flees in an
automobile: "We think that police need not have taken that chance and
hoped for the best. ' 30  Clearly, reckless driving or flight from police
officers by vehicle represents a deadly hazard for the public.30 9
Because officers have a duty to protect the public by stopping dangers
on the public highways, vehicular flight by suspects, where an officer
could reasonably believe that the fleeing suspect might kill or seriously
injure others, will generally warrant deadly force to stop the fleeing
vehicle.
In Ford v. Childers, for example, the Seventh Circuit held that an
officer's actions "were objectively reasonable under the circumstances
leading to his decision to fire his revolver at [the suspect,] Ford. '3 10
The officer was held to have acted reasonably in shooting at the fleeing
suspect even though the officer could not be certain as to whether the
suspect was armed.311 Officer Childers was called to the scene of a
bank robbery in progress. 312 He could see the hands of the bank
patrons in the air from outside; however, he could not see the suspect
304. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985)
305. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1778.
306. Id. at 1773.
307. Id. at 1775.
308. Id. at 1778.
309. Id. at 1779.
310. 855 F.2d 1271, 1275 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
311. Id.
312. Id. at 1272.
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or any weapon that the suspect may have been wielding.313 Ford
exited the bank carrying only a bag.314 Officer Childers and his part-
ner pursued Ford and warned him to stop.3 15 When he did not stop
running, both officers fired shots, shooting Ford in the back.31 6 The
Seventh Circuit explained that "[als we recognized in another . . .
police shooting [case], a reasonable belief that danger exists may be
formed by reliance on appearances. '317 The court reasoned:
In view of the totality of the information Officer Childers possessed
when he fired at Ford, we hold that a reasonable jury could only con-
clude that Officer Childers had probable cause to believe that Ford
posed a threat of serious physical harm to himself and/or to others.
Thus, Childers' actions under the circumstances were objectively rea-
sonable as a matter of law.318
Similarly, in Forrett v. Richardson, a suspect who supposedly tied
up three people-shooting one victim in the neck and assaulting
another-was shot by officers while trying to escape. 319 The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that "the only reasonable conclusion that could be drawn
from the evidence when construed most favorable to the plaintiff was
that the officers did not violate plaintiff's Fourth Amendment
rights. 320
According to the facts, Forrett broke into a home, tied up those
inside, and fled in a stolen truck.32' After Forrett had left the house,
one of the victims was able to free himself and give police a description
of Forrett and the truck.322 Police located the truck within an hour,
but there was no sign of the suspect or the firearm. 32 3 Police can-
vassed the area and located Forrett in a residential neighborhood.324
He ran and the police gave chase.325 The chase continued for about an
hour with Forrett scaling fences, ducking into a shed, and taking off a
layer of clothing to alter his appearance.32 6 Finally, officers trapped
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 1275 (citing Davis v. Freels, 583 F.2d 337, 341 (7th Cir. 1978)).
318. Id. at 1276.
319. 112 F.3d 416, 418 (9th Cir. 1997).
320. Id. at 421.
321. Id. at 418.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
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him in a yard that had a six-foot fence.327 The officers warned Forrett
to quit running, but as Forrett paused, the officers fired at him.3 28 For-
rett jumped the fence and officers fired through it shooting him in the
back and hip.329
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that "[t]he only objectively reasonable
conclusion to be drawn from this evidence is that if the defendants had
not shot him, he would have continued taking whatever measures were
necessary to avoid capture. "330 The court observed that "[t]he use of
deadly force was objectively reasonable under these circumstances,"
and held that the plaintiffs rights were not violated as a matter of
law.
3 3 1
D. Brosseau, Scott, and Vehicle Related Cases Afford Even Greater
Latitude to Officers to Protect Themselves and the Public
Two recent Supreme Court cases, and many other cases, demon-
strate how suspect flight by automobile poses especially dangerous cir-
cumstances for officers and the public thereby often justifying deadly
force.332 Fleeing suspects hardly exercise due care regarding public
safety on highways.333 Officers are often put in situations where they
must theoretically balance numerous factors while staying focused on
accomplishing the core mission of apprehending the suspect. Using
force to stop a suspect fleeing by automobile is often crucial because of
the prospect of death or injury to many members of the public.
Before, or at the beginning of, vehicular flight, officers are often
out of their vehicles on foot dealing with stopped suspects. When a
stopped suspect attempts to flee with an officer that is on foot, the
dangers to the officer are greatly enhanced. Specifically, a vehicle
might quickly turn or spin to put the officer at risk of death-even
when the vehicle is not aimed directly at the officer.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 418-19.
330. Id. at 421.
331. Id.
332. See Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194
(2004).
333. See Abney v. Coe, 439 F.3d 412, 418 (4th Cir. 2007) (describing a fleeing
suspect's tactics, which endangered innocent motorists on the road); Jennifer Golson,
3 Charged After Car Pins Officer During Arrest, STAR-LEDGER, Feb. 27, 2009, available at
http://www.nj.com/news/ledger/jersey/index.ssf?/base/news- 12/123571238385901.
xml&coll=l; Carol J. Williams, Rash of Televised Police Chases Highlights Cost, Risks,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2009, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/local/crime/la-
me-freeway-chases 19-2009 feb 19,0,23098.story.
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In Smith v. Freeland, the Sixth Circuit addressed a vehicular flight
case and explained:
[Ujnder Graham, we must avoid our personal notions of proper police
procedure for the instantaneous decision of the officer at the scene.
We must never allow the theoretical, sanitized world of our imagina-
tion to replace the dangerous and complex world that policemen face
every day. What constitutes "reasonable" action may seem quite differ-
ent to someone facing a possible assailant than to someone analyzing
the question at leisure.
3 34
In Smith, Officer Schulcz tried to pull over a driver he saw run a
stop sign.335 Instead of stopping, Smith led Officer Schulcz on a high-
speed chase for about three miles before turning down a dead-end resi-
dential street.3 36 As Smith tried to turn his car around, Officer Schulcz
moved his car closer, bringing the two vehicles hood to hood.337 Once
the cars were sufficiently close, Officer Schulcz got out of his car and
began to approach Smith.338
As Officer Schulcz approached on foot, Smith backed up, drove
forward, rammed Schulcz's car, and then backed up again to go
around it.3 39 When Smith drove by, Officer Schulcz shot and killed
him.34 0 The court held that the seizure was not unreasonable. 34 1 The
court reasoned that:
After a dramatic chase, Officer Schulcz appeared to have trapped his
man at the end of a dark street. Suddenly Mr. Smith freed his car and
began speeding down the street. In an instant Officer Schulcz had to
decide whether to allow his suspect to escape. He decided to stop him,
and no rational jury could say he acted unreasonably. 342
The court further explained that:
Had [Smith] proceeded unmolested down Woodbine Avenue; he posed
a major threat to the officers manning the roadblock. Even unarmed,
he was not harmless; a car can be a deadly weapon. Finally, rather
than confronting the roadblock, [Smith] could have stopped his car
and entered one of the neighboring houses, hoping to take hostages.
Mr. Smith had proven he would do almost anything to avoid capture;
334. 954 F.2d 343, 347 (6th Cir. 1992).
335. Id. at 344.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 348.
342. Id. at 347.
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Officer Schulcz could certainly assume he would not stop at threaten-
ing others.3
43
As indicated, the Sixth Circuit noted that "a car can be a deadly
weapon" and since Smith had already assaulted an officer, it was rea-
sonable to assume that he was willing to go to extremes.344 A "reason-
able officer in those circumstances would certainly believe that if Mr.
Smith continued this escape attempt, he posed a significant threat of
physical injury to numerous others. 345
In Brosseau v. Haugen, the Supreme Court addressed a case involv-
ing a suspect who was shot in the back while attempting to flee in an
automobile.346 After a foot chase, the suspect jumped into an automo-
bile and appeared ready to drive.347 Officer Brosseau approached the
driver's side window and verbally ordered the suspect to stop and get
oUt.34 8 As the suspect began to drive away, Officer Brosseau fired,
striking the suspect in the back.349 Officer Brosseau stated that she
fired her weapon because she feared that the suspect might run over
other officers or citizens in the area.35 ° The Supreme Court explained
that "[q]ualified immunity shields an officer from suit when she makes
a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misappre-
hends the law governing the circumstances she confronted. '351 Not-
ing Smith v. Freeland's conclusion that "a car can be a deadly weapon,
and holding [an] officer's decision to stop the car from possibly injur-
ing others was reasonable," the Court implied that Officer Brosseau
was entitled to qualified immunity.352
In Scott v. Harris, the Supreme Court applied its traditional force
doctrine in the context of a vehicular chase.35 3 Scott represents a logi-
cal extension of the Court's developing body of use of force law. The
Graham objective reasonableness standard was reaffirmed and applied
in the context of a traditional police pursuit.354
The Court in Scott framed the narrow issue as "whether a law
enforcement officer can, consistent with the Fourth Amendment,
343. Id. (citations omitted).
344. Id.
345. Id. at 346.
346. 543 U.S. 194 (2004).
347. Id. at 196.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 196-97.
350. Id. at 197.
351. Id. at 198.
352. Id. at 200.
353. 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).
354. Id. at 1776.
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attempt to stop a fleeing motorist from continuing his public-endan-
gering flight by ramming the motorist's car from behind. 355
In that case, a Georgia deputy attempted to stop the plaintiffs
vehicle after clocking it at nearly twenty miles per hour over the speed
limit.3 5 6 A chase down mostly two lane roads followed with speeds
topping eighty-five miles per hour.357 The deputy radioed information
regarding the pursuit to his dispatcher.3 5 8 Defendant, Deputy Timothy
Scott, overheard this radio communication and joined the pursuit.35 9
At one point, the plaintiff was nearly surrounded in a parking lot but
managed to get away, damaging Deputy Scott's car in the process.36 °
Deputy Scott then took the front position in the pursuit.3 6 1 The chase
had covered about ten miles when Deputy Scott requested and received
permission to perform a "precision intervention technique" (PIT)
maneuver, which causes the "fleeing vehicle to spin to a stop. '3 62 Dep-
uty Scott claimed he abandoned his attempt at the PIT maneuver when
he determined it would be unsafe, but had already applied his "push
bumper to the rear of [plaintiffs] vehicle. '363 As a result, the plaintiff
lost control of his car and careened down an embankment. 364 Plaintiff
was rendered a quadriplegic.365
Plaintiff filed suit alleging excessive force under the Fourth
Amendment.366 Scott moved for summary judgment based on quali-
fied immunity.367 The district court denied the motion.368 On inter-
locutory appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
denial.36 9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed 3 70
In examining the facts, the Court observed that evidence in the
record included a video tape which captured the chase in question.371
This video tape, according to the Court, clearly contradicted the ver-
355. Id. at 1772.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 1772-73.
359. Id. at 1773.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 1774.
371. Id. at 1775.
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sion of facts presented by plaintiff and adopted by the court of
appeals.3 72
In its analysis, the Court determined that the question to be
decided under the Fourth Amendment was whether Deputy Scott's
actions were objectively reasonable, explaining: "Whether or not
Scott's actions constituted application of 'deadly force,' all that matters
is whether Scott's actions were reasonable."
37 3
In Scott, the Court reaffirmed use of the objective reasonableness
balancing teSt.37 4 In determining the reasonableness of a seizure,
courts "must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the
governmental interest alleged to justify the intrusion. '375 The Court
observed that Deputy Scott successfully defended his actions by
asserting the "paramount governmental interest in ensuring public
safety."376 Elaborating on the issue, the Court stated: "[W]e must
consider the risk of bodily harm that Scott's actions posed to respon-
dent in light of the threat to the public that Scott was trying to
eliminate."
377
In weighing the likelihood of injuring or killing bystanders against
the probability of injuring or killing a single person who is fleeing, the
Court observed that "it [is] appropriate in this process to take into
account not only the number of lives at risk, but also their relative
culpability. ' 378 In essence, the Court balanced the risk of harm to
bystanders as compared with the assumed risk of harm by the fleeing
plaintiff. The Court explained that it was the Plaintiff "who intention-
ally placed himself and the public in danger by unlawfully engaging in
the reckless, high-speed flight that ultimately produced the choice
between two evils that Scott confronted. '3 79 Accordingly, the Court
concluded that the officer's actions were reasonable.3
The plaintiff argued that the "innocent public equally [could] have
been protected and the ... accident entirely avoided if the police had
ceased their pursuit. '38 1 Not persuaded by that argument, the Court
372. Id.
373. Id. at 1778.
374. Id.
375. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id.
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stated that "police need not have taken that chance and hoped for the
best. ' 38 2 Elaborating on this issue, the Court reasoned,
[W]e are loath to lay down a rule requiring the police to allow a fleeing
suspect to get away whenever they drive so recklessly that they put other
people's lives in danger. It is obvious ... the perverse incentives such a
rule would create .... The Constitution assuredly does not impose
this invitation to impunity-earned-by-recklessness. Instead, we lay
down a more sensible rule: a police officer's attempt to terminate a
dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent
bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it
places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.38 3
The Court recognized and respected the grave risk of harm
presented to officers, bystanders, and other innocent motorists on the
highway. 38 4 The fleeing plaintiffs conduct necessarily assumed a risk
of harm to himself. Those factors and the traditional balancing
inquiry appear to have made the decision an easy one for the Court,
resulting in an 8-1 decision with a sole dissent by Justice Stevens. 38 5
Lower courts have begun to apply the rule and reasoning of Scott.
In Abney v. Coe, the Fourth Circuit addressed a case arising out of a
collision between a fleeing motorcyclist and a pursuing sheriffs dep-
uty. 38 6 The motorcyclist refused to pull over for the sheriffs deputy,
Deputy Coe, who had spotted him driving erratically. 7 A chase
spanning roughly eight miles followed, ending when the deputy's car
and motorcycle crashed. 3 8 The motorcyclist was killed. 38 9 The plain-
tiff alleged that Deputy Coe used excessive force in violation of the
Fourth Amendment by intentionally ramming the rear of the
motorcycle.390
The plaintiff argued that Deputy Coe's actions were unreasonable
and unconstitutional because the motorcyclist "did not pose any risk
to the public that justified using force that placed him at risk of seri-
ous injury or death."391 Additionally, the plaintiff claimed that a
"high-speed chase of a suspect fleeing after a traffic infraction does not
amount to the 'substantial threat' of imminent physical harm .. .
382. Id.
383. Id. at 1779.
384. See id. at 1778.
385. See id. at 1781 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
386. 493 F.3d 412 (4th Cir. 2007).
387. Id. at 414.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 415.
390. Id.
391. Id.
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require[d] before deadly force can be used. ' 392 The Fourth Circuit
began its qualified immunity analysis by reciting the essential princi-
ples from Saucier v. Katz.393 The court explained that "reasonableness
is evaluated from the perspective of the officer on the scene, not
through the more leisurely lens of hindsight."394 Rejecting the plain-
tiffs positions, the court found Deputy Coe's conduct reasonable.395
When public safety is the interest supporting a seizure, the Fourth
Circuit explained that courts should "consider the risk of bodily harm
that the officer's actions posed to the suspect in light of the threat to
the public that the officer was trying to eliminate."396 The court con-
cluded that there "was a danger to the life of others" during the pursuit
and it was therefore "eminently reasonable to terminate the chase in
order to avoid further risks to the lives of innocent motorists.
3 9 7
Thus, it held that the deputy's "attempt to terminate a dangerous...
car chase [that] threatened the lives of innocent bystanders did not
violate the Fourth Amendment, even though it placed the fleeing
motorist at risk of serious injury or death."39" Because the Fourth Cir-
cuit found the deputy's conduct to be reasonable, it was unnecessary
to address qualified immunity. 39
9
Addressing other issues, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed that the
Department's policy forbidding PITs does not determine "whether
those tactics are constitutional. 400 The court observed that it is "set-
tled law that a violation of departmental policy does not equate with
constitutional unreasonableness." 40 ' Therefore, the county's policy
frowning upon the use of such intervention techniques was found to
be of no consideration in determining "whether [the deputy's] conduct
was consistent with the Fourth Amendment."
40 2
The Fourth Circuit further explained that "[t]he subjective beliefs
as to the reasonableness of an intervention technique are [equally]
irrelevant to the constitutional inquiry. "403 The Court concluded that
"an officer's subjective belief that a particular use of force was unrea-
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 416 (citation omitted).
395. Id. at 421.
396. Id. at 416 (internal quotation marks omitted).
397. Id. at 417.
398. Id. at 418 (internal quotation marks omitted).
399. Id.
400. Id. at 419.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 420.
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sonable is [not] proof of any constitutional violation. '40 4 The court,
therefore, reversed and granted summary judgment as a matter of law
for the deputy because his conduct was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.4 °5
Many other cases involving suspects either fleeing in vehicles or
preparing to flee have resulted in qualified immunity for the officer.
Moving vehicles or vehicles capable of moving near a police officer
often present grave risks of death. A vehicle can lunge in a split second.
In Pittman v. Nelms, the Fourth Circuit held as a matter of law that a
police officer did not use excessive force in shooting a fleeing suspect
from the rear.4°6 In Pittman, two officers, Banks and Nelms, stopped a
car belonging to a suspected drug dealer.40 7 After approaching the car,
Banks leaned inside to speak to the driver, Hudson, and Hudson took
off.40 8 After Banks was thrown back from the car, Nelms fired his gun
hitting a passenger in the back.40 9 The Court reasoned that under
these facts, "an objectively reasonable officer certainly could have
believed that his decision to fire was legally justified. '4 10
In Long v. Slaton, the Eleventh Circuit illustrates the point that
whether a suspect appears likely to engage in a dangerous vehicular
flight is highly relevant to the question of whether deadly force is rea-
sonable.4 ' In Long, the court held that an officer was justified in
shooting a suspect who was attempting to steal a police vehicle, prima-
rily because the suspect's behavior suggested that he would continue
to flee and was likely to cause a dangerous chase.412 The court held
that the officer's decision to shoot the suspect was objectively reasona-
ble even though the suspect had put the vehicle in reverse and was
backing away from the officer at the time the officer fired the fatal
shot.413
In Scott v. Edinburg, an off-duty police officer, Edinburg, had
stopped at a local restaurant and left the keys in the ignition of his
personal vehicle.4 14 While Officer Edinburg was attempting to buy
something to eat, Scott climbed into Edinburg's car and attempted to
404. Id.
405. Id. at 421.
406. 87 F.3d 116, 118 (4th Cir. 1996).
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 120.
411. 508 F.3d 576, 580 (11th Cir. 2007).
412. Id. at 580-83.
413. Id. at 580-81
414. 346 F.3d 752, 754 (7th Cir. 2003).
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steal it. 4 15 Edinburg ran to the back of the car and started yelling
"stop" and "that's my car" to Scott as Scott started to back up.4 1 6 Scott
then put the car in forward and drove away.417 As Scott was driving
away, Edinburg drew his service revolver and fired several shots, one
of which struck and killed Scott.418 Both parties agreed that Edinburg
did not start firing until the vehicle was in forward and was driving
away. 41 9 Additionally, the parties agreed that there were approxi-
mately twelve to fourteen people in the parking lot at the time of the
incident, but disagreed on whether any of these patrons were in the
direct path of the vehicle as it fled the scene or whether Scott's driving
caused any of the patrons in the parking lot to flee in order to avoid
being struck.42 ° In fact, the plaintiff offered affidavit testimony from
two eyewitnesses who stated that none of the patrons were "in the
direct path of the vehicle's travel" and that "no people ran or were
forced to flee from the vehicle's path to avoid being struck."42 '
Despite the plaintiff's affidavits, the Seventh Circuit held that
Officer Edinburg was still entitled to summary judgment because
Edinburg could have reasonably believed that Scott's actions posed a
threat to the bystanders or others.422 The court held that Officer
Edinburg was not required to show that bystanders were in the direct
path of the vehicle, only that people "in the immediate vicinity" might
have been placed in danger due to Scott's actions.423 The court noted
that it was also highly relevant that Scott had "committed a forcible
felony" and had almost run over Officer Edinburg in the process.424
Scott, Brousseau, Abney, Slaton, and Edinburg represent a reaffir-
mation of traditional use of force principles from older vehicular cases,
such as Pittman, and clarified application to cases involving vehicles.
Abney interpreting Scott v. Harris suggests that courts will enforce the
letter and spirit of Scott: criminal suspects who assume risks of death
in vehicular pursuits will not recover where the pursuing officers act to
eliminate risks to public safety by stopping the risky conduct by the
fleeing suspect. 425 It seems extremely unlikely that any court will
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id. at 758-59.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 759.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. See Abney v. Coe, 493 F.3d 412, 413-14 (4th Cir. 2007)
53
McGuinness: A Primer on North Carolina and Federal Use of Force Law: Trends i
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2009
CAMPBELL LAW REvIEW
determine a pursuit to be constitutionally unreasonable where the pur-
suing officers could have reasonably believed that their action in stop-
ping the suspect was appropriate. As in the traditional use of force
context, the "could have believed" standard should insulate the
officers.
VIII. A SUMMARY OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY PRINCIPLES
IN USE OF FORCE CASES
Individual capacity actions against officers are subject to the doc-
trine of qualified immunity. The Supreme Court has held that "gov-
ernment officials performing discretionary functions generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.142 6 Moreover, the
Court has stated that the qualified immunity defense "provides ample
protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law. 4 27
In deciding whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity,
there are two relevant inquires. Generally, a court will begin by exam-
ining whether the plaintiff has properly alleged a violation of a clearly
established constitutional right.428  If so, the court must decide
whether the defendant's actions were objectively reasonable.429 While
this order of analysis is generally appropriate, courts may depart from
this sequence in appropriate cases.430 The Court has interpreted
"clearly established" to mean that "the contours of the right must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that
what he is doing violates that right. 431
The Fourth Circuit has been especially insightful and progressive
in affording qualified immunity to police officers in most use of force
litigation. The court has explained that law enforcement officers "are
not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing
bright lines. '43 2 Where there is a legitimate question as to whether the
426. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
427. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
428. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231-35 (1991).
429. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987).
430. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009).
431. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198-99
(2004); Sigman v. Town of Chapel Hill, 161 F.3d 782, 787 (4th Cir. 1998) (affirming
the lower court's grant of summary judgment to police officers who shot and killed a
suspect whom the officers perceived was holding a knife and began walking towards
the officers).
432. Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992).
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officer's conduct would objectively violate the plaintiffs rights, quali-
fied immunity "gives police officers the necessary latitude to pursue
their investigations without having to anticipate, on the pain of civil
liability, future refinements or clarifications of constitutional law." '433
In Slattery v. Rizzon, the Fourth Circuit noted that "the purpose of
qualified immunity is to remove most civil liability actions, except
those where the official clearly broke the law, from the legal process
well in advance of the submission of facts to a jury." '434 Furthermore,
granting qualified immunity to law enforcement officers "ensures that
these officers can perform their duties free from the specter of endless
and debilitating lawsuits."43  Finally, "permitting damages suits
against governmental officials can entail substantial social costs,
including the risk that fear of personal monetary liability and harass-
ing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their
duties. "436
The Fourth Circuit has clearly explained qualified immunity in
the use of force context: "The Constitution simply does not require
police to gamble with their lives in the face of a serious threat of
harm. ' 43 7 In Elliot v. Leavitt, the court declared that "[t]he Fourth
Amendment does not require police officers to wait until a suspect
shoots to confirm that a serious threat of harm exists. '4 38 It explained
that:
Claims that law enforcement officers used excessive force when
making an arrest "should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment
and its 'reasonableness' standard." The standard of review is an objec-
tive one. The intent or motivation of the officer is irrelevant; the ques-
tion is whether a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would
have concluded that a threat existed justifying the particular use of
force. A police officer may use deadly force when the officer has
sound reason to believe that a suspect poses a threat of serious physi-
cal harm to the officer or others.439
433. Tarantino v. Baker, 825 F.2d 772, 775 (4th Cir. 1987).
434. 939 F.2d 213, 216 (4th Cir. 1991).
435. Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 260 (4th Cir. 1991). See Tarantino, 825
F.2d at 775 ("[Clertainly we cannot expect police officers to carry ... a Decimal
Digest on patrol; they cannot be held to ... a legal scholar's expertise in constitutional
law.").
436. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638.
437. Elliot v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640, 641 (4th Cir. 1996).
438. Id. at 643.
439. Id. at 642 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)) (citing
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)) (citations omitted).
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The Fourth Circuit has also recognized that the doctrine of quali-
fied immunity in excessive force cases and the inquiry under Graham
v. Connor must reflect the considerations underlying the analysis of an
immunity defense.44° A reviewing court may not employ "the 20/20
vision of hindsight" and must make "allowance for the fact that police
officers are often forced to make split-second judgments-in circum-
stances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving."' 44 ' The court's
focus should be on the circumstances at the moment force was used
and on the fact that officers on the beat are not often afforded the
luxury of armchair reflection.442
In Saucier v. Katz, the Supreme Court addressed qualified immu-
nity in a law enforcement use of force case:
[Plolice officers are often forced to make split-second judgments-in
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving-about
the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation, the rea-
sonableness of the officer's belief as to the appropriate level of force
should be judged from that on-scene perspective. We set out a test that
cautioned against the "20/20 vision of hindsight" in favor of deference
to the judgment of reasonable officers on the scene.44 3
In Pittman v. Nelms, the Fourth Circuit held as a matter of law that
a police officer did not use excessive force in shooting a fleeing suspect
from the rear.4 44 In Pittman, two officers, Banks and Nelms, stopped a
car belonging to a suspected drug dealer. 445 After approaching the car,
Banks leaned inside to speak to the driver, Hudson, and Hudson
attempted to flee.446 After Banks was thrown back from the car, Nelms
fired his gun hitting a passenger in the back.447 The Court reasoned
that under these facts, "an objectively reasonable officer certainly
could have believed that his decision to fire was legally justified. 448
In Carr v. Deeds, state troopers were sued under an excessive force
theory for a shooting death. 449 The Fourth Circuit affirmed qualified
immunity for the troopers, explaining that "[b]ecause 'police officers
are often forced to make split-second judgments-in circumstances
440. See Slattery v. Rizzo, 939 F.2d 213, 215-16 (4th Cir. 1991).
441. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97.
442. See Greenidge v. Ruffin, 927 F.2d 789, 791-92 (4th Cir.1991) (citing Graham,
490 U.S. at 395-96).
443. 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
444. 87 F.3d 116, 118 (4th Cir. 1996).
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. Id. at 120.
449. 453 F.3d 593, 596 (4th Cir. 2006).
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that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving,' the facts must be evalu-
ated from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, and the
use of hindsight must be avoided."45
In Wilson v. Flynn, the Fourth Circuit affirmed qualified immu-
nity for police officers.45  Officer Flynn was sent to arrest Wilson for
a domestic violence dispute. 452 Flynn tried to put Wilson in handcuffs
but Wilson resisted.453 Flynn and Wilson began fighting and Wilson
was struck in the face and sprayed with mace.454 Wilson later asserted
in a deposition that he was shoved, stomped, punched repeatedly,
kicked, and sprayed with mace by the officers.455 Wilson also asserted
that his face was slammed into a fireplace screen.456
The Fourth Circuit explained that it must first address "whether a
constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged.
457
The first step in an excessive force case "requires analysis 'under the
Fourth Amendment's 'objective reasonableness' standard.' ' 458 The
Fourth Circuit concluded that the use of force was not objectively
unreasonable. 45 9 Therefore, qualified immunity for the officer was
affirmed.46 °
This emphasizes that the "officer's perceptions at the time of the
incident in question" is the dispositive point and "limits second-guess-
ing the reasonableness of actions with the benefit of 20/20 hind-
sight."'461 The Fourth Circuit has stressed that, "[i]n evaluating
excessive force claims, 'the reasonableness of the officer's belief as to
the appropriate level of force should be judged from that on-scene per-
spective."462 Even law enforcement activities deemed as "disturbing"
are subject to qualified immunity.463
The doctrine of qualified immunity has a broad scope that is con-
sistently interpreted to insulate police officers from individual liability
450. Id. at 600 (citations omitted).
451. 429 F.3d 465, 467 (4th Cir. 2005).
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001)).
458. Id. at 467-68 (quoting Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989)).
459. Id. at 469.
460. Id.
461. Milstead v. Kibler, 243 F.3d 157, 163 (4th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
462. Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 369 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Saucier, 533
U.S. at 204).
463. Gomez v. Atkins, 296 F.3d 253, 266 (4th Cir. 2002) (Hamilton,J., concurring).
487
57
McGuinness: A Primer on North Carolina and Federal Use of Force Law: Trends i
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2009
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
in virtually all use of force cases where a reasonable officer could have
reasonably believed that the force was necessary. The trends in these
use of force cases should deter some of the continuing frivolous use of
force claims.
IX. THE DOCTRINE OF PUBLIC OFFICER IMMUNITY AS A DEFENSE TO
STATE LAW BASED USE OF FORCE CLAIMS
Plaintiffs may initiate alleged wrongful death claims and tort
claims for assault and battery, and possibly other torts, where officers
have used force. However, ordinary tort principles are generally inap-
plicable against police officers. Rather, through the doctrine of public
officer immunity, officers are typically immunized except where there
is malice, corruption or clear abuse of authority or action exceeding
the scope of authority. Public officers performing official functions
such as using force are protected from civil tort liability by immu-
nity.464 The policy underlying this grant of immunity has been
explained by North Carolina's appellate courts as follows:
The complex process of legal administration requires that officers
shall be charged with the duty of making decisions, either of law or of
fact, and acting in accordance with their determinations. Public ser-
vants would be unduly hampered and intimidated in the discharge of
their duties, and an impossible burden would fall upon all our agen-
cies of government if the immunity to private liability were not
extended, in some reasonable degree, to those who act improperly, or
exceed the authority given.465
Law enforcement officers are public officers, and are entitled to
immunity from liability for acts within their official duty. 46 6 In Grad v.
Kassa, the North Carolina Supreme Court explained that "[a]s long as
a public officer lawfully exercises the judgment and discretion with
which he is invested by virtue of his office, keeps within the scope of
his official authority, and acts without malice or corruption, he is pro-
tected from liability. 4 6 7
It is only when a public officer exceeds or abuses his authority
that immunity does not apply.466 In Mazzucco v. Board of Medical
464. See State ex rel. Jacobs v. Sherard, 243 S.E.2d 184, 187 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978);
Mazzucco v. N.C. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 228 S.E.2d 529, 531 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976).
465. Sherard, 243 S.E.2d at 187-88 (quoting WILLIAM PROSSER, THE HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 132 (4th ed. 1971)).
466. See id. at 188.
467. 321 S.E.2d 888, 890 (N.C. 1984) (quoting Smith v. State, 222 S.E.2d 412, 430
(N.C. 1976)).
468. See Mazzucco, 228 S.E.2d at 531.
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Examiners, the North Carolina Court of Appeals declared that "[n]o
action lies against a public officer for an honest exercise of his discre-
tion, though erroneous, but for a corrupt or malicious exercise of dis-
cretion such officer may be made to respond in damages to an
individual injured thereby." '469 A claimant must allege and prove cor-
ruption or malice when the alleged wrongdoer performs official duties
involving the exercise of discretion. 470 Where there is no allegation
that the defendant-officer exceeded his authority or acted outside the
scope of his duty, the officer is entitled to summary judgment.4 71
It is well settled in North Carolina that a public officer engaged in
the performance of a governmental function involving the exercise of
judgment and discretion may not be held liable for actions in the
course and scope of employment.4 72 A synthesis of these public
officer immunity cases suggests a compelling analogy to the applica-
tion of qualified immunity to federal constitutional claims. Both quali-
fied immunity and public officer immunity are predicated upon the
same policy concerns of not requiring officers to defend civil claims
when officers act reasonably even when mistaken. The public officer
immunity cases also use an objective standard of analysis similar to
qualified immunity.473 Therefore, many state law based use of force
claims against police officers are subject to summary judgement
disposition.
X. LEADING FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT CASES DEMONSTRATE
APPLICATION OF USE OF FORCE TESTS
A. Objective Reasonableness in General
In Milstead v. Kibler, the Fourth Circuit addressed Fourth Amend-
ment constitutional tort claims arising out of a clearly mistaken shoot-
ing death.474 An emergency call by Mark Milstead shortly after
469. Id. at 531-32.
470. See Jones v. Kearns, 462 S.E.2d 245, 248 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995).
471. See Sherard, 243 S.E.2d at 189 (granting a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a
claim in favor of defendant-officers where plaintiff did not allege that defendants acted
outside the scope of duty).
472. See, e.g., Smith v. Hefner, 68 S.E.2d 783, 787 (N.C. 1952); Hare v. Butler, 394
S.E.2d 231 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990); Piggot v. City of Wilmington, 273 S.E.2d 752, 755
(N.C. Ct. App. 1981).
473. See Bailey v. Kennedy, 349 F.3d 731, 742 (4th Cir. 2003); Massasoit v. Carter,
439 F. Supp. 2d 463 (M.D.N.C. 2006); Lea v. Kirby, 171 F. Supp. 2d 579 (M.D.N.C.
2001) (noting its use of "essentially the same analysis as the Section 1983 claim," and
applying the reasonable person standard to public officer immunity); Grad v. Kaasa,
321 S.E.2d 888 (N.C. 1984) (utilizing standard of "man of reasonable intelligence").
474. 243 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2001).
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midnight to a 911 operator sought police help as a result of an alleged
physical attack by an intruder, Ramey.475 The operator reported Mil-
stead's call to the Officers Kibler and Proctor, indicating that a man
had been shot in the neck and a woman stabbed.476 The officers
responded immediately after receiving the call.477
When the officers arrived they observed "a van parked in front of
the house, with the door open, and fresh blood on the van and on the
steps leading to the house. ' 4 78 They also heard calls for help coming
from inside the house.479 Proctor kicked open the door and yelled
"police. ' 4 0 The officers observed two men wrestling on the floor and
one of them yelled that the other man had a gun. 481 Then the person
with the gun pointed it at Proctor, who reacted by backing up and
firing four shots from his pistol.4 2 While Proctor was backing up, he
stumbled and fell backwards outside the door.48 3 Officer Kibler then,
"believing that Proctor had been shot, retreated to the outside corner of
the house . . . [and assumed] a defensive position. "484 Kibler then
heard someone from inside say "that he was going to 'kill all of
you.'"4s Shortly after Kibler's retreat, someone ran through the door
and turned towards him.486 The officer "fired two shots, bringing the
person down. '"487 Unfortunately, Kibler had mistakenly shot Milstead
instead of the assailant Ramey.488 Milstead was transported to the hos-
pital, where he subsequently died.489
The Fourth Circuit stated that the Fourth Amendment's reasona-
bleness standard is the appropriate method by which to analyze all
instances in which law enforcement officers have allegedly used exces-
sive force, whether deadly or not, in the course of any arrest, investiga-
tory stop or other seizure. 490 After recounting all of the pertinent
circumstances, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the mistaken impres-
475. Id. at 160.
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. Id.
480. Id.
481. Id.
482. Id.
483. Id.
484. Id.
485. Id.
486. Id.
487. Id.
488. Id.
489. Id.
490. Id. at 162.
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sions by the officer were completely reasonable and justifiable under
the circumstances. 49
1
Mistakes of this nature usually involve one of two scenarios. The
first involves an officer justifiably shooting at a suspect, but acciden-
tally missing and hitting a bystander.492 The second involves an
officer justifiably shooting and hitting a person he mistakenly believes
to be the suspect, but who is actually an innocent person. 493 No
Fourth Amendment seizure occurs under the first type of mistake.494
The second form of mistake, the one applicable in Milstead, implicates
the Fourth Amendment, but is not a violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment because the mistake is not necessarily unreasonable.495
Officer Kibler's mistaken understanding was not enough to
render his use of force unreasonable.496 According to the Fourth Cir-
cuit, because Office Kibler had an objectively reasonable belief that
Milstead was Ramsey, his "mistake [did] not negate the justification for
the use of deadly force."497 In support of its reasoning, the court noted
that "[t]he Fourth Amendment addresses 'misuse of power,' not the
accidental effects of otherwise lawful conduct. '498 Further, the court
indicated that "courts cannot second guess the split-second judgments
of a police officer to use deadly force in a context of rapidly evolving
circumstances, when inaction could threaten the safety of the officers
or others.
4 99
In Anderson v. Russell, the Fourth Circuit addressed an alleged
excessive force complaint following a jury verdict in the plaintiff's
favor.5 0 With respect to the officer's qualified immunity defense, the
trial court granted the officer's motion for judgment as a matter of law,
but the court denied the same motion as to the jury's finding of use of
excessive force.50 1 The court concluded that even though Officer Rus-
sell used deadly force, he did so reasonably in order to protect himself
against the threat posed by Anderson, which Officer Russell perceived
491. Id. at 165.
492. Id. at 163.
493. Id.
494. Id. at 164.
495. Id.
496. Id. at 165.
497. Id.
498. Id. (quoting Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989) (citation
omitted)).
499. Id.
500. 247 F.3d 125 (4th Cir. 2001).
501. Id. at 128.
61
McGuinness: A Primer on North Carolina and Federal Use of Force Law: Trends i
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2009
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
to be immediate and deadly. 50 2 Thus, the verdict was set aside in its
entirety.5 °3
Russell, a law enforcement officer, was providing part-time secur-
ity services at a mall.50 4 Anderson had been drinking wine all day
and, after buying another bottle at the mall, drank that bottle while he
walked around the mall.50 5 Anderson was wearing three shirts, a
sweater, and a jacket, and, inside one of these shirts, Anderson had
tucked a shoe polish container inside an eye-glasses case.50 6 In addi-
tion, Anderson carried a portable walkman radio in his back pocket
and listened to the radio with earphones covered by his hat.
50 7
While pointing to Anderson, a mall patron informed Officer Rus-
sell that a man appeared to have a gun under his sweater.50 8 After
observing Anderson for twenty minutes, Officer Russell spotted a
bulge under Anderson's clothing near the waistband that he believed to
be consistent with a handgun.50 9 Concerned, Russell decided to con-
front Anderson in order to determine whether Anderson was armed
and what his intentions were.510 Officer Russell and one other officer
followed Anderson as he exited the mall, approached him with their
guns drawn, and gave him instructions to raise his hands and kneel on
the ground.511 Anderson raised his hands initially, but, without expla-
nation, later lowered them, supposedly in order to turn off the porta-
ble walkman radio that was in his back pocket.512 With this
movement, Officer Russell believed Anderson was reaching for a
weapon, and, for safety reasons, Russell shot Anderson three times,
which later caused Anderson permanent injuries. 513 A subsequent
search of Anderson revealed he was unarmed and in possession of a
radio, not a weapon.514
The Fourth Circuit held that Anderson's excessive force claim
should not have been submitted to the jury because Officer Russell did
not violate the Fourth Amendment with the amount of force he
502. Id. at 127.
503. Id.
504. Id.
505. Id.
506. Id. at 127-28.
507. Id. at 128.
508. Id.
509. Id.
510. Id.
511. Id.
512. Id.
513. id.
514. Id.
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used.515 The evidence established that Officer Russell was reasonable
in thinking that Anderson was armed with a gun.516 The court noted
that "[tihis Circuit has consistently held that an officer does not have
to wait until a gun is pointed at [him] before the officer is entitled to
take action."'517 Despite the mistake and Anderson's injuries, the court
determined that, since the officer's conduct was reasonable, the exces-
sive force claim should have been dismissed. 518 In other words, the
law does not and is not prepared to "redress injuries resulting from
reasonable mistakes. 519
In Elliott v. Leavitt, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's
denial of qualified immunity in an alleged excessive force case. 520
According the facts, Officer Leavitt pulled over a motorist, Elliot, who
had clearly been drinking.521' Elliott failed several of the sobriety tests
given by Leavitt and the officer called for backup.522 After arresting
Elliot, Leavitt conducted a brief search of the backside of Elliott's body,
but was unsure of whether he searched the front.523 Officer Leavitt
and the backup officer put Elliott in the front passenger seat of the
police car, fastened Elliot's seatbelt, and closed the door and win-
dow.524 While standing near the passenger side of the car with the
backup officer, Leavitt noticed a movement and saw Elliott pointing a
small handgun at the officers with his finger on the trigger.525 The
officers ordered Elliott to drop the gun but when Elliott failed to
respond he was shot and killed.526
The plaintiff argued a number of considerations not relevant to
the objective reasonableness inquiry. For example, the plaintiff argued
that the officers could have responded differently by moving further
away from the car rather than shooting.52' Agreeing with this sugges-
tion, the district court concluded that the number of shots fired by the
officers was excessive.528 In response, however, the Fourth Circuit
515. Id. at 129.
516. Id. at 130.
517. Id. at 131.
518. Id. at 132.
519. Id. (quoting McLenagan v. Karnes, 27 F.3d 1002, 1008 (4th Cir. 1994)).
520. 99 F.3d 640 (4th Cir. 1996).
521. Id. at 641.
522. Id.
523. Id.
524. Id.
525. Id. at 642.
526. Id.
527. Id. at 643.
528. Id.
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explained that "[t]he number of shots by itself cannot be determinative
as to whether the force used was reasonable. 529
The evidence in Leavitt demonstrated that the officers fired simul-
taneously, that neither officer fired all of the available shots from his
weapon, and that the shooting occurred within seconds.530 As to the
plaintiffs argument and the district court's suggestion that the officers
could have moved further away, the Fourth Circuit explained that such
a suggestion reflected an observation made from the "'peace of a
judge's chambers' [rather] than [from] ... a dangerous and threatening
situation on the street."531
The Fourth Circuit clearly emphasized that, in order to comply
with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, one need not be
omniscient.532 Additionally, it is not required that officers be abso-
lutely sure of the suspect's intent to cause harm or of the nature of the
threat made because "the Constitution does not require that certitude
precede the act of self protection. '' 533 Emphasizing this point, the
court indicated that "[t]he Constitution simply does not require police
to gamble with their lives in the face of a serious threat of harm. '534
Applying the above-stated principles, the Fourth Circuit, in Slat-
tery v. Rizzo, determined that an officer, who shot a criminal suspect,
was not liable because the court found it objectively reasonable for the
officer to have believed that the suspect was reaching for a gun, when
in fact the object in the suspect's hands was a beer bottle.535 Similarly,
the defendant-officer in McLenagan v. Karnes was found not liable
when the officer shot an unarmed suspect who appeared to be chasing
another officer. 536 Due to the fact that the suspect was handcuffed in
front of his body, the officer could not determine whether the suspect
was unarmed.537 The Fourth Circuit explained that:
[A] suspect's failure to raise his hands in compliance with a police
officer's command to do so may support the existence of probable
cause to believe that the suspect is armed. ...
. . . [W]e do not think it wise to require a police officer, in all
instances, to actually detect the presence of an object in a suspect's
hands before firing on him .... We will not second-guess the split-
529. Id.
530. Id.
531. Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).
532. Id. at 644.
533. Id.
534. Id. at 641.
535. 939 F.2d 213, 216-17 (4th Cir. 1991).
536. 27 F.3d 1002, 1005, 1009 (4th Cir. 1994).
537. Id. at 1005.
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second judgment of a trained police officer merely because that judg-
ment turns out to be mistaken, particularly where inaction could have
resulted in death or serious injury to the officer and others .... [Sec-
tion] 1983 does not purport to redress injuries resulting from reasona-
ble mistakes.
53 8
The Fourth Circuit, in Sigman v. Town of Chapel Hill, affirmed the
trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendant-police officers
who fatally shot a suspect, believed to possess a knife, when he began
advancing toward the officers.5 39 The court rejected the plaintiffs
argument that a factual dispute existed as to whether the suspect had a
knife, deciding that it was immaterial in determining whether the
officer was protected by qualified immunity. 540 Thus, an officer may
justifiably fire if he or she reasonably perceives that a suspect may
have a weapon.
In Krueger v. Fuhr, the Eighth Circuit decided that an officer's
shooting of a fleeing suspect was objectively reasonable.5 4 1 Officer
Fuhr responded to a call identifying the area in which a suspect was
allegedly spotted.5 4 2 Fuhr believed that the suspect had just commit-
ted an assault at a laundry and was possibly an escapee from a halfway
house. 4 3 While canvassing the area, Officer Fuhr spotted the suspect,
Krueger, and approached him with his service revolver drawn.54 4 He
then told Krueger to freeze.5 4 5 Instead, Krueger ran and Fuhr pursued
him. Fuhr continued to yell for Krueger to stop, but Krueger continued
to flee and, as he ran, tried to pull something from his waistband. 4 6
Fuhr witnessed Krueger's attempt to grab something from his waist-
band, slowed his pursuit, and fired four shots at the suspect.
54 7 Two of
the shots hit Krueger in the back and one hit him in the base of the
skull, killing him.54 8
In assessing the case, the Eighth Circuit indicated that any issues
regarding the shot to Krueger's back were not sufficient to establish a
material issue of fact as to whether Officer Fuhr acted reasonably.5 4 9
538. Id. at 1007-08.
539. 161 F.3d 782, 787 (4th Cir. 1998).
540. Id.
541. 991 F.2d 435, 440 (8th Cir. 1993).
542. Id. at 437.
543. Id.
544. Id.
545. Id.
546. Id.
547. Id.
548. Id.
549. Id. at 439.
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The court determined that Officer Fuhr was reasonable in his belief
that "he faced a serious and immediate danger of physical harm when
Leroy Krueger pulled, or seemed to pull, a knife from his waist-
band.15 50 The court concluded that police officers are not required to
"forgo the use of deadly force to prevent their own death or serious
physical injury whenever there is a possibility that another officer
might later apprehend the fleeing suspect."'1 5 1
B. Bullet Trajectory Does Not Determine Justification
At first glance, cases involving "back shots," or shootings from a
rear position, may suggest that the shooting was unnecessary because
the danger was leaving the scene. However, ballistics studies reveal
"that a person can turn around in less time than it takes to fire a drawn
and pointed weapon. ' 552 This recognized "lag time" or "reactionary
gap" phenomenon justifies many cases with shootings from the rear as
being objectively reasonable.
The number of shots fired, by itself, is not determinative in the
use of force inquiry. 3 An officer is required to shoot until the threat
is stopped, whether it takes one shot or forty-one shots. Modern
police firearms will typically fire up to fifteen rounds in a matter of
three or four seconds. Thus, it is common to have a large number of
shots in a given encounter. Because of the lag time phenomenon, it is
not unusual for shots to enter a suspect in the side or in the back. In
the time it takes to unholster, prepare, and fire a weapon, the position
of the suspect has often materially changed. After the first shot or
warning, it is not unusual for a suspect to turn his or her back to the
officer out of fear. These scenarios often justify back shootings, which
on the surface may appear suspicious.
Many of the foregoing cases demonstrate challenging fact patterns
but no liability. However, it must be remembered that the objective
reasonableness standard considers the totality of the circumstances,
including the fact that dangers are not necessarily reduced because a
suspect is in flight.
550. Id.
551. Id. at 440.
552. Ernest J. Tobin & Martin L. Fackler, Officer Reaction-Response Times in Firing
a Handgun, 3 WOUND BALLISTICS REv. 3, 6 (1997). See Mark Hansen, Faster Than a
Speeding Bullet: Study Says Quick Turns by Suspects Can Account for Gunshot Wounds in
Back, ABAJ., Sept. 1997, at 38.
553. Elliot v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640, 643 (4th Cir. 1996).
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XL. THE USE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY-IN USE OF FORCE LITIGATION
Expert testimony may be appropriate in some use of force cases
regarding certain narrow and specific issues. Some law enforcement
disputes require specialized or technical knowledge beyond that usu-
ally understood by lay jurors . 5 4 A number of older cases demonstrate
the admission of expert testimony in civil, criminal, 55 and administra-
554. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, "[i]f scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion." FED.
R. EVID. 702. Expert testimony is properly admissible when such testimony may assist
the jury to draw inferences from facts because the expert is better qualified on the
issues than are lay persons. See State v. Bullard, 322 S.E.2d 370 (N.C. 1984). When
assessing the admissibility of expert testimony, the test is whether the jury will receive
help from the expert witness. See JAMES H. CHADBOURN, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1923
(1978).
555. See United States v. Alonso, 48 F.3d 1536, 1541 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that
there was no error in permitting undercover agents conducting a sting to characterize
a defendant's counter-surveillance behavior as consistent with someone being involved
in criminal activity and that a law enforcement expert may testify as to "techniques
and methods" used); United States v. Gastiaburo, 16 F.3d 582, 587-89 (4th Cir. 1994)
(holding that there was no error in admitting testimony about methods of drug dealers
and explaining how expert testimony as to the "modus operandi" is "commonly
admitted"); United States v. Williams, 980 F.2d 1463, 1465-66 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(allowing an expert in a drug case to testify that more than 100 zip lock bags
concerning small amounts of drugs "were meant to be distributed at street level");
United States v. Roldan-Zapata, 916 F.2d 795, 805 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that it was
proper to admit testimony from an expert witness testifying as to police surveillance
and record keeping procedures); United States v. Lawson, 780 F.2d 535, 542 (6th Cir.
1985) (upholding the admission of police officer's testimony concerning the meaning
of certain terms used in drug trafficking); United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 760-
61 (2d Cir. 1984) (allowing government agents to testify that in their opinion an
incident involving a defendant was a narcotics transaction because the agents were
experts whose testimony might have aided the jury in understanding the events);
United States v. Scavo, 593 F.2d 837, 844 (8th Cir. 1979) (affirming the admission of
expert testimony about the nature of gambling operations, gambling terminology, and
his opinion of the defendant's role in a bookmaking scheme); United States v. Phillips,
593 F.2d 553, 558 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding that there was no error in admitting
testimony in a narcotics case interpreting code language in intercepted telephone
conversations).
See also United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160, 1169-70 (9th Cir. 2000)
(allowing expert testimony about gang behavior); United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337,
1345 (7th Cir. 1996) (testimony admissible showing that a particular defendant was
susceptible to interrogation techniques that would lead him to make unreliable
statements); United States v. McCollum, 802 F.2d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1986)
(upholding admission of expert testimony regarding the typical structure of mail fraud
schemes).
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tive litigation involving use of force and related law enforcement
issues.556
In the last several years, a number of courts have issued decisions
which have shifted the trends and have tightened the parameters of
admissibility of expert testimony, particularly in the area of use of
force. Recent cases demonstrate how courts have rejected testimony
from purported police procedures experts attempting to broadly opine
that an officer's use of force is "unreasonable," "not justified," or "inap-
propriate. 557 These cases demonstrate that broad conclusory use of
force opinions are generally inadmissible. Many purported experts
556. North Carolina courts admit expert testimony in many fields where juries can
benefit from such specialized knowledge. Among those areas are law enforcement and
related matters. See, e.g., Yassoo Enters., Inc. v. N.C. Joint Underwriting Ass'n, 325
S.E.2d 677, 680-81 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985). Expert testimony has also been allowed on
the standard of skill required in particular employment. Alva v. Cloninger, 277 S.E.2d
535, 541-42 (1981) (expert testimony addressing "duties" in a given field). See Alley v.
Charlotte Pipe & Foundry Co., 74 S.E. 885, 886-87 (1912).
557. Alan H. Scheiner, Excluding "Police Practices" Experts in Federal Court: The Rule
Against "Telling the Jury What Result to Reach," MUNICIPAL LAWYER, July-Aug. 2008, at 7,
8. See, e.g., Thompson v. City of Chicago, 472 F.3d 444, 453-54 (7th Cir. 2006); Clem
v. Corbeau, 98 Fed. Appx. 197, 201 (4th Cir. 2004); Pena v. Leombruni, 200 F.3d
1031, 1034 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he jury needed no help in deciding whether [the
officer acted] reasonably"); Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 364 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding
that expert's testimony that the force used was "not justified" was inadmissible);
Berardi v. Village of Sauget, No. 05-898 (S.D. Ill. July 21, 2008).
A number of older cases had more freely allowed experts to opine in loose general
terms. For example, in Zuchel v. City of Denver, a law enforcement expert was
properly permitted to testify that the officer's use of deadly force was inappropriate.
997 F.2d 730, 743 (10th Cir. 1993). In Zuchel, the criminal justice professor was
permitted to give expert opinion testimony of "police tactics, the use of force,
administration, supervision, and training." Id. at 738. The expert also testified about
police training, tactics, and options available to police in situations where bodily
injury is threatened. Id. at 739. The court held that expert testimony is admissible on
whether the practices followed fell below acceptable standards. Id. at 742. The area of
admitted expert testimony involved "generally accepted police custom and practice at
the time." Id. at 739. The court noted that the professor was an expert in "police
training, tactics, and the use of deadly force. Courts generally allow experts in this
area to state an opinion on whether the conduct in issue fell below accepted standards
in the field of law enforcement." Id. at 742. In McEwen v. City of Norman, expert law
enforcement testimony was permitted on the issue of reasonableness of force. 926
F.2d 1539, 1546 (10th Cir. 1991). There, a professor testified as to the propriety of
the police pursuit, the review procedures of the police chief, roadblocks, the method of
arrest, and the overall handling of the incident. Id. However, in more modern cases, a
number of courts have begun to disallow the often loose and conclusory opinions of
purported plaintiff's experts who seek to opine that an officer did something wrong.
See, e.g., Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1348-50 (6th Cir. 1994) (observing
"junk science" concerns). Thus, McEwen is inconsistent with the more modern cases.
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claim to base their opinions on "good police practices" or agency pol-
icy violations, which are categorically irrelevant in determining rea-
sonableness. Thus, the more contemporary cases are excluding these
general use of force opinions. Despite the substantial tightening of the
parameters of expert testimony in use of force cases, there appears to
remain some specific areas within law enforcement where appropriate
expert testimony may be permitted.
Law enforcement experts have testified in state and federal courts
in North Carolina in law enforcement related cases.558 In older cases,
the conduct of law enforcement officers was the subject of expert testi-
mony in various scenarios, including employment cases where the
appropriateness of the officer's behavior was at issue.55 9
In Kopf v. Skyrm, for example, the Fourth Circuit addressed
expert evidentiary standards in a law enforcement use of force case.
560
The court held that the specialized training of a police dog is a proper
558. The following outlines the general parameters of admissibility of expert
testimony in North Carolina courts. Rule 702 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence
provides: "If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion." N.C. R. EVID. 702. Expert testimony is properly admissible
when such testimony may help the jury to draw inferences from facts because the
expert is better qualified on the issues than are lay persons. See State v. Bullard, 322
S.E.2d 370 (N.C. 1984). Under North Carolina law, "[t]he test for admissibility of
expert testimony is whether the jury can receive 'appreciable help' from the expert
witness." State v. Knox, 337 S.E.2d 154, 156 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (citations omitted).
The leading North Carolina evidence treatise states that "[u]nder Rule 702, once
expertise is demonstrated, the test of admissibility is helpfulness. A witness who is
better qualified than the jury to form a particular opinion may satisfy the Rule."
KENNETH S. BROUN, BRANDIS AND BROUN ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 184 (6th ed.
2004) (footnotes omitted). In order to qualify, the expert need not be a specialist, have
a particular license, or have had any experience with the exact type of subject matter
involved. Id. (citing dozens of cases). The minimum prerequisite is that "through
knowledge ... the testimony can assist the trier of fact." Id. See State v. Howard, 337
S.E.2d 598, 603-04 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) ("To qualify, the expert need not have had
experience in the very subject at issue .... It is [sufficient] that through study or
experience the expert is better qualified than the jury to render the opinion regarding
the particular subject." (citations omitted)); see also State v. Saunders, 345 S.E.2d 212,
216-17 (N.C. 1986) (allowing a pathologist to offer expert testimony to assist the jury
in understanding the nature of the decedent's wound and whether the defendant acted
in self-defense, even though self-defense was an ultimate issue in the case).
559. See Webb v. City of Chester, 813 F.2d 824, 832-33 (7th Cir. 1987) (allowing a
law enforcement professor to testify "as to the appropriateness of plaintiffs actions" in
each of the six incidents).
560. 993 F.2d 374, 378-79 (4th Cir. 1993).
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subject of expert testimony.5 6' The court also held that a law enforce-
ment expert should be permitted to testify as to the general standard
of conduct with respect to use of a police slapjack.562 Kopf s emphasis
on admitting testimony regarding specialized skills might survive the
more current trends.
In Lawson v. Trowbridge, the Seventh Circuit held that admission
of expert testimony regarding the dangerousness of carrying knives
and how to arrest individuals carrying concealed weapons was
proper.563 Furthermore, in Samples v. City of Atlanta, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit held that there was no error in permitting an expert to testify as to
whether it was reasonable for an officer to discharge his firearm when
the victim charged the officer with a knife.564 The expert was allowed
to testify as to whether the shooting "was justified. '565 However, this
would not be admitted under many of the contemporary cases.
In Slakan v. Porter, the Fourth Circuit upheld a decision involving
an inmate's excessive force claim against prison guards.566 In this
older case, the court found no error in the admission of expert testi-
mony as to the punitive nature of using water hoses on inmates in
North Carolina.567 Slakan, therefore, involved a narrow matter of
expertise as opposed to the more general use of force issues.
The Eleventh Circuit, in Parker v. Williams, held that it was per-
missible for the plaintiff's law enforcement expert to testify that the
law enforcement agency was grossly negligent in hiring a jailer.568
Additionally, in Vineyard v. County of Murray, the Eleventh Circuit
held that expert testimony relating to the inadequacy of law enforce-
ment training was admissible. 569 A professor of criminal justice, quali-
fied as an expert in "police operations," was permitted to testify that
the practice of not logging complaints-which can alert a law enforce-
ment agency that an officer may have a history of using excessive
force-as well as the lack of follow-up on such complaints, constituted
a ratification of the wrongs that the agency knew had been
committed.57 °
561. Id. at 379.
562. Id.
563. 153 F.3d 368, 375-76 (7th Cir. 1998).
564. 916 F.2d 1548, 1552 (11th Cir. 1990).
565. Id.
566. 737 F.2d 368, 378 (4th Cir. 1984).
567. Id.
568. 855 F.2d 763, 777-78 (11th Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 862 F.2d
1471 (11th Cir. 1989).
569. 990 F.2d 1207, 1210, 1212-13 (11th Cir. 1993).
570. Id.
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The standards for admitting expert testimony in use of force cases
have been restricted by many courts in the last several years. Highly
technical aspects of the use of force may still be subject to expert testi-
mony. However, courts appear much less willing to throw open the
door for plaintiffs to offer academic opinions relating to particular
instances of force in general terms or addressing the ultimate issues.
CONCLUSION
Alleged excessive force cases typically arise from instantaneous
judgment calls made by law enforcement officers under the most diffi-
cult circumstances. Because of the proliferation of extensive use of
illegal guns by criminals and the necessity of quick police action, some
innocent citizens will inevitably be injured or killed by law enforce-
ment officers, especially where such innocent citizens make gestures
inferring that weapons are being retrieved. Vehicular flight has
emerged as another increasing threat to officers and public safety.
Most everyone has an after-the-fact opinion about how they may have
responded somewhat differently. However, use of force law expressly
prohibits such Monday morning quarterbacking.
The trends from the recent cases recognize the growing threats
against the American law enforcement profession. The doctrine of
qualified immunity has been enhanced to provide greater insulation
against use of force claims. The body of use of force law has evolved
consistent with the growing dangers from criminal conduct to police
officers and public safety.
The Graham, Garner, Saucier, Brousseu, and Scott Supreme Court
cases strike an appropriate balance between affording potential reme-
dies for objectively unreasonable conduct and protecting officers who
act consistent with reasonable beliefs, even when mistaken. The
Fourth Circuit and North Carolina cases strictly adhere to the
Supreme Court's continuing mandate that officers are not liable for
reasonable mistaken beliefs or reasonable mistakes. A synthesis of fed-
eral and North Carolina law has enunciated workable standards
which afford considerable discretion and latitude to officers whose
lives are often at immediate risk in encounters where force becomes
apparently necessary.
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